

bad (adj.)

c. 1200, "inferior in quality;" early 13c., "wicked, evil, vicious," a mystery word with no apparent relatives in other languages.

music (n.)

mid-13c., musike, from Old French musique (12c.) and directly from Latin musica "the art of music," also including poetry (also source of Spanish musica, Italian musica, Old High German mosica, German Musik, Dutch muziek, Danish musik), from Greek mousike (techne) "(art) of the Muses," from fem. of mousikos "pertaining to the Muses," from Mousa "Muse" (see muse). Modern spelling from 1630s. In classical Greece, any art in which the Muses presided, but especially music and lyric poetry. ...

muse (v.)

*"to reflect, to be absorbed in thought," mid-14c., from Old French muser (12c.) "to ponder, dream, wonder; loiter, waste time," literally "to stand with one's nose in the air" (or, possibly, "to sniff about" like a dog who has lost the scent), from muse "muzzle," from Gallo-Roman *musa "snout," of unknown origin.*

BAD MUSIC

and the end of thought.

JLIAT/James Whitehead

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Preface.

This short piece¹ was provoked by some thoughts about music which is produced in the current milieu in art, in music in particular within post-modernity (or post-post...) where theory has been applied, abandoned, where silence and noise explored. I coined the term 'Bad Music' as the creation of bad music relies on the simplest of methods, a mere repetition of pre given pre programmed samples and note sequences. So like noise 'music'² the works are without particular skill and exhibit a lack of meaningful content. Though some will find noise in its lack of structure interesting to listen to, I have maintained its importance is more in its ontology. I deliberately ignored the psychological conditions of the 'Personae' within the genre of noise and of its technologies. The obvious psychological preoccupations – motivation- was that noise is easy to make and though very easy to create at the same time the maker could consider himself or herself as an Artist. Importantly in my opinion it avoids the challenge to 'anyone' claiming to be an artist in music which is generally open to comparison with the body of music as a whole or some particular genre, an acid test of Stairway to Heaven or John Cage for instance, and so open to negative (more than positive) criticism. OK punk rock might be an exception and varieties of metal, but even here dexterity and skill are to be found as measures, as is originality to a lesser extent? The other psychological preoccupation of noise Personae (and music elsewhere) is 'gear'. Gear fetish, the collection of gear, the making of gear, circuit bending etc. Debates around Analogue Vs Digital, the approval of cassette tape because of its qualities or lack of qualities, the anti lap top pro lap top 'debates'... Euro rack enthusiasts. Often like the Hi Fi enthusiast in all this the actual production of sound is lost or of less significance than the gear itself and

¹ Well now a book! I started this just to explore some thoughts on Deleuze and how these related to a very simple use of synths. The text is perhaps not that well structured and I'm dealing with quite difficult philosophy on the one hand and applying it to something very simple on the other. Written originally just for my own amusement, now I'm proof reading it and trying to get rid of typos and make it as comprehensible as I can but in doing so I'm very aware that if anyone else reads this they might find sections 'clunky' and the writing not as good as it should be. Nevertheless I think it might have some interest. And I write this as a P.S. a rather strange conclusion.

² As in noise-music the 'musician' is only minimally responsible for the actual type of sound creation, this being by far and away a result of the 'gear' used.

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the image of the Personae - 'musician'? This is not new in art, especially music, though extreme when the actual 'sound' is irrelevant. As I've elsewhere pointed out in cases of Harsh Noise Wall not only is there no content of a communicable message but there is no way of discerning the source of the sound. It might simply be a white noise generated via Audacity with bass boost applied or the product of thousands of pounds worth of euro-rack modules, or of painstakingly hand built devices or rescued 'antique' sound equipment. Music in general has been – to a lesser extent in psychological terms perhaps – conditioned by 'gear', by technology. The development of instruments has had both a compositional effect and (so) an audible effect. This marks a significant difference from 'noise music'. The animal skin, and bow, the reed, the piano, valve instruments, electric amplification and the development of recording and effects have caused the forms of music to change, and in these cases discernibly, unlike noise.

One intention in making 'Bad Music' is to reverse the ambiguity of Noise in which it is opaque to the technology which creates it, and yet maintain its ontology- a simple givenness. 'Bad Music' reveals the technology of music as the music in itself as the place which gives the possibility of particular performances in which only the simple 'revealing'³ of the technology matters. Until recently most musical devices required 'playing', with the introduction of synthesisers, samplers and sequencers these devices arrive already with the technology to 'play themselves'. They arrive – with inbuilt music, not just as sound devices. And so it is possible to have a music which is generic. This 'platform' is in my opinion a peculiar presentation of the image of music⁴. It's also the pure manifestation of the gear and gear fetish without performer intervention. It takes this fetish from the noise idiom, and yet unlike noise reveals rather than conceals itself. Like a computer game playing chess against itself the generics of chess are demonstrated without the human interaction of expertise, struggle and

³ Cool quote - "To raise the question of *aletheia*, of disclosure as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call *aletheia*, in the sense of opening, truth." - Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 70, translation amended. (Though Martin would have hated this kind of technology!)

⁴ Ibid.

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intent to perform, and perform well. The 'moves' mark the potential for the game, but not the game itself as played.

My original interest in noise was how something empty of content could be considered as being music or art. Is noise - music, can it be art? The questions of the status of 'Bad Music' are not the same as noise 'music'. It's obviously 'music' though it might not be considered art or a music of any worth, of any good, which is why it's 'Bad'. It's more like a generic, devoid of anything of particular interest. Such a generic is not 'A Work of Music', but an (mere) 'Image of Music'.

Which is why I pick up on Deleuze's use of the term 'The Image of Thought' in *Difference and Repetition* of 1968, and as it appears in a different guise as 'The Plane of Immanence' in his work of 1991 with Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*. Both books are difficult, and I make no philosophical claims to or for them other than to illustrate some ideas (or theories) about 'Bad Music' within the context of contemporary thought. The term 'bad' therefore is used as an indication of its emptiness, as an image might be considered empty of concrete reality, difference and novelty, and all the aesthetic attributes of art objects.

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-(Original short blurb.... By way of an introduction) ~~Bad Music.~~

Why Bad Music is Pop Music.

James Whitehead who is JLIAT.

Introduction.

With noise as a completeness, a wall of undifferentiated, unrecognisable sound we reach the moment in which noise becomes the same as silence. Empty or totally full, its ability to communicate, its epistemic is zero, and its being, its onticity and its ontology- what it is now and what it is absolutely, become the same and infinite⁵.

Any teleological progress therefore is not possible, a back-tracking into noise as music, be it Power Electronics, avant-garde, free jazz, free form improvisation is possible but will only double what has already occurred. A doubling of music. Forward 'tracking' would be into neo-metaphysics from the obvious Noise = Being, Silence = Nothing – the opening 'move' in Hegel's dialectics in The Science of Logic, in and through a metaphysical text of Idealism towards and back from an absolute of absolute thought rather than object, matter, sounds, music. An extreme conceptualism... or 'tuning'. "Conceptual opera: how far is too far?"

This can be described as idealism's letting lose of the conceptual, free of the empirical by which a transcendental music / noise is posited. That is it can be considered that both 'silence', 'noise' and music / art as transcendentals are 'fictions', and not realizeable, not real. As is any idealism.

An alternative – oblique strategy:

Art music becomes music un-sutured from art, popular music must un-suture the popular from the music. The popular is the common place

⁵ (See 'Pop goes Reason' paper - presented at The University of Falmouth April 2015.) <http://www.jliat.com/txts/pop%20goes%20reason.pdf>

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and 'ready-at-hand', the generally available product. The form – of art music – its formalism must be not deconstructed – into minimalism – but destroyed – but without noise – by the popular. The popular must be destroyed or removed from its cliché by avant-garde expressionist irony- art yet maintain its generic form and ubiquity. The naïve 'song' becomes the 'theme' – its production the other theme. The naïvety of the 'song' displayed in its popularist terms through fine-art's – pop-art's ironic 'truth to materials' as obvious expression of the material, its electronics and its recording as a recoding, rather like the (crass) silk screens of Warhol, expressionist field paintings of banal pop subjects whose execution is marked by the materiality of the printing process in its failure yet still sufficient to 'portray' its now intellectually empty – but popular – image. The image of image and of its technique fully exhibited.

This is called 'Bad Music' as 'Pop Music' but not the Pop-Art-Music, a term for what has become an image of excellence. Rather like Deleuze's original pejorative term 'image of thought' in 'Difference and Repetition'⁶ Pop art is the smart failure to reproduce pop, pop-music. Bad Music is the 'failure' as demonstration of the real of popular musical production and re-asserts the pejorative term for Pop (Merzbow calls pop-music noise!). What the popular excludes, the glitch, the error, or what it employed as avant garde- become the substrate of its production and presentation- re-presentation- re-re-presentation and broadcast. Bad Music is Neo-Pop-Art-Music is "Pop Music". Bad Music is Music not a Music. It presents music rather than re-presenting music.

Neo-neo Marxism:

The obsession with technology and the means of production.
(Musikmesse)

A (counter-counter) Cultural revolution. (Islamic state)

The 'dogmatism' of the liberal cultural 'finish' of neo-modernity. (The café in the Tate Modern)

Neo-neo Freudism:

The fetish of the 'gear'. (Moog, Arp, Korg, Roland, Yamaha..)

⁶ not as it re-appears in 'What is Philosophy?'

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The id over and above the ego(democracy) and super-ego. (God, culture, The Universe – ity)

The rip, the bleed, the image of the 'back stage' in the staging. (Photo-booth drama)

The ink of printing, the hand tremor of writing, the error or slip. (aspergers, alzheimer's, the anti-digital – Thalidomidization of popular music)

Neo-neo Lacanianism (Neo Žižekianism):

The jouissance of music for a non-musician. (as non-philosopher – Laruelle)

The individual particular worker over and above the abstract concept. (Flesh-event – Badiou)

The disease rather than the cure. (Guattari)

Neo-neo McLuhanism: Object as totem. (Harman)

Medium as 'massage'. (Meillassoux)

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The Image of Music as The Image of Thought.

The transgression of a nomadic journey from The Image of Thought as anti-philosophy to The Image of Thought as philosophy will develop the image of music as the doxa of music into the creative non-identified original repetition of difference.(!)

Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* makes a complex and detailed critique of 'The Image of Thought' as dogmatic thinking. He attributes this image with Common sense and Good sense. It is not surprising that some have thought these 'senses' to be those we are familiar with outside of philosophy, as a commonly understood knowledge, unfortunately in D&R they are they are not⁷.....

Deleuze undertakes a radical move in the third chapter of D&R, whereas the first two chapters can be seen as locating him historically within the history of philosophy the third introduces, via a critique, a radical new move in thinking. The 'idea' as radical novelty and creativity as opposed to the concept. The points made in the first two chapters in *Difference and Repetition* have natural and deliberate affinities with art. Art employs difference in its objects, in its subjects but also often repeats these as a series or as variations. We could now retrace the ideas of *Difference* – chapter 1 - as the differences in western art, western music, and the repetition of the art object, another painting, another play, another symphony, another object of art, a different repetition of the same. And in turn radically critique this, the difference in an idea (not a concept) as in an art object is "difference in itself", a repetition is not a true repetition if it is the same. Why? well $A = A$ is the impossibility of repetition, the second 'A' is both the same and is different. It might be easier to see how $A-A$ could as a negation might not result in nothing, of a null, or zero. In certain logics it obviously does, but in others, notably that of Hegel, such an operation never results in an end negation. Hegel's term for such a negation of a different kind is 'Aufhebung⁸' in

⁷ I have even heard 'philosophers' offer 'common sense' as the sense of the common people and good sense as a judgement, a good judgement. I am not in agreement with this at all, and I am not a philosopher.

⁸ Aufheben or Aufhebung is a German word with several seemingly contradictory meanings, including "to lift up", "to abolish", "cancel" or "suspend", or "to sublate". The term has also been defined as "abolish", "preserve", and

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english 'sublation'. This is not of mathematical logic, $2-2 = 0$, or $a-a = \text{nothing}$, but of Hegel's dialectic. Think of this as a chemical process, a negative 'chemical' dialects, $\text{acid} + \text{alkali} = \text{salt}$ ⁹. So a repetition in itself creates something new – a difference. This is crucial to Deleuze in D&R as he seeks to turn the non-creative repetition of Nietzsche's Eternal Return ***of the Same***¹⁰ (my emphasis) into a process for the creation of something new.

In the history of art as in the history of philosophy a logical production of modernity was an empty negation, end of a black canvas, empty gallery, $4' 33'' = 273$ seconds of silence, and the traces of this negation was a remarkable 'failure'. However it is not sufficient merely to note this as failed dialectics which led to the crisis in modernity and the announcement of post-modernity. Using Deleuze's idea we can now see the failure was the failure to repeat as a 'repetition in itself', and so a failure to create a difference. This is Deleuze's creative 'Eternal Return' of 1968. How this is to be done is not in or out of the remains of a logical sublation, an abolition of art and philosophy but a 'lifting up' and above. The radical immanence of which Deleuze speaks is a 'transcendental' empiricism, a transcendent immanence, the idea free of ideal.

In our contemporary world the situation is very different to 1968, even for those who think it not, their problem in Deleuzian terms would be how to repeat '68' as difference and not the same. My idea is through the very 'evils' of technology¹¹, as opposed to the Heideggerian techne and poesis of the german-greek aletheia there has now been produced a superfluity of ideas, objects, information, data, stuff... which are 'presented'. Technology has brought about change, created stuff, which

"transcend". In philosophy, *aufheben* is used by Hegel to explain what happens when a thesis and antithesis interact, and in this sense is translated mainly as "sublate" -wiki

⁹ Sodium (alkali metal - spontaneously burns in air) + Chlorine (diatomic nonmetal - extremely poisonous gas) = Salt.

¹⁰ "Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things." The Gay Science 109 – Friedrich Nietzsche.

¹¹ I'm obliquely referring to Heidegger's disapproval of modern technology and his desire to return to some pre Socratic Arcadia....

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in a sense of D&R can be seen as an event which has disrupted the prevailing doxology of Art and even Philosophy itself. (And so any antipathy towards this process is one of dogmatic resentment at this disruption.)

So I'm going to explore the idea of 'the idea' arising from the virtual and destabilizing the senses and opposing the dogmatic image of thought as developed in the third chapter of D&R in some detail, detail which is complex and confusing but let us not be dissuaded from the task.

In 'The Image of Thought' as presented in Difference and Repetition there are eight postulates!– to overcome. These provide the description of the dogmatic image of thought – the dogma of thought as a set of rules for safe thinking¹², which is not thought as idea, not thought at all but a ritual repetition of the same, doxa. Like the frozen unthinking, unquestioned doxology of church ritual.

The eight postulates.

1. Good will¹³. We take it on trust that we come to philosophy and art with a good will. Both the intentions of Artist / Philosopher and Audience/Reader are assumed to be good or have to be good or should be good. This is a given (doxa again), but this 'good' is a given good and guarantees a good outcome – defines our expectations. We expect the book to be good, the performance to be good, we want to make the performance good. But only by bad thinking is thought or art really possible, creative unexpected thought or art, otherwise we chant the rosary without passion. Art is taken as 'good', a 'society' a cooperation, a harmony. A new work of art is no longer first seen as something bad, no longer are audiences outraged. The good will of all concerned is guaranteed but not even taken for granted. This good nature is both a moral image and one that is uncritical, promoted and funded. The work is presented and understood as good. Even if misunderstood, or not understood, the work is accepted (as good), typically 'this work questions the nature of....' And questioning is good! The idea of a

¹² To be clear - a 'safe thinking' to which Deleuze is opposed.

¹³ Again Deleuze is opposed to 'Good Will' (and all the other postulates) – for him good will prevents real creativity. It does not allow the process of creation via the eternal return.

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harmful critique is thus domesticated, the nomad housed in a settlement and so safe from her environment and safe from us. Here the image is a fixed given. Think stereotype, whatever is the case, an understanding, an 'I know'. Already 'I know', is present before the event, so its being is a given, the event is nothing new as it's already pre-scribed in good thinking good behaviour. In art and music this has become like a person in a 'society', it has all the necessary credentials for a peaceful and harmonious life within a community of peaceful harmony. Aliens are kept out or else integrated.

2. Common sense, this needs some explanation. This sense is the community of categories of understanding, the common categories of sense, the given by which we think well. For the categories of sense we can use Aristotle's 10 or Kant's 12¹⁴... or others- but they pre-suppose a

¹⁴ Aristotle's

1. Substance (ousia, "essence" or "substance"). Substance is defined as that which neither can be predicated of anything nor be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars "primary substances", to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates.

2. Quantity (poson, "how much"). This is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period.

3. Quality (poion, "of what kind or quality"). This is a determination which characterizes the nature of an object.

4. Relation (pros ti, "toward something"). This is the way in which one object may be related to another.

5. Place (pou, "where"). Position in relation to the surrounding environment.

6. Time (pote, "when"). Position in relation to the course of events.

7. Position (keisthai, "to lie"). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: 'Lying', 'sitting'. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.

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way of thinking. These form a community of the senses, a community for appreciation, apperception and thought. A (common) community of senses which if kept in balance with each other and in orderliness is good sense.

Not only Kant's or Aristotle's categories form these communities of order - but also the elements of music¹⁵, Poetry¹⁶ and Fine Art / The Plastic Arts...¹⁷ Thus the 'community' of these are common sense and when they are in harmony and right proportion are good sense.

8. State or habitus (echein, "to have"). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): 'shod', 'armed'. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the determination arising from the physical accoutrements of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, "to have").

9. Action (poiein, "to make" or "to do"). The production of change in some other object.

10. Affection (paschein, "to suffer" or "to undergo"). The reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, 'to lance', 'to cauterize'; for affection, 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized.' The term is frequently misinterpreted to mean a kind of emotion or passion.

Kant's Categories

- Quantity

 - Unity

 - Plurality

 - Totality

- Quality

 - Reality

 - Negation

 - Limitation

- Relation

 - Inherence and Subsistence (substance and accident)

 - Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)

 - Community (reciprocity)

- Modality

 - Possibility

 - Existence

 - Necessity

Others include -

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“Good sense determines the contribution of the faculties in each case, while common sense contributes the form of the same”¹⁸

Thus the identity of the object, be it consciousness, other (person) or (art) object is guaranteed by these credentials...

“For Kant as for Descartes, it is the identity of the Self in the ‘I think’ which grounds the harmony of all the faculties and their agreement on

Chisholm's system of categories.

- Entia
 - Contingent
 - States
 - Events
 - Individuals
 - Boundaries
 - Substances
- Necessary
 - States
 - Nonstates
 - Attributes
 - Substance

Reinhardt Grossman (1983, xvi).

- Individuals
- Properties
- Relations
- Classes
- Structures
- Quantifiers
- Facts
- Negation

Lowe's.

- Entities
 - Particulars
 - Objects
 - Substances
 - Non-substances
 - Modes (monadic and relational)
- Universals
 - Kinds
 - Attributes (properties and relations)

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the form of a supposed Same object”¹⁹.

The terms ‘Dogma’ and ‘Doxa’²⁰ relate to these authoritative, moral credentials of ‘being’ and of art which is the pejorative sense of not only the given by authority but an authority which identifies the individual, as a classification, and legitimates all activity with clearly defined borders of whatever categories are used. Within modernity and post-modernity in art the liberal acceptance is the dogmatic doxology. The overturning of common and good sense not only occurs out of an ‘ill

¹⁵ Ballata; Estampie; Gregorian Chant; Madrigal (Trecento); Motet; Organum; Saltarello; Ballade; Canzona; Carol; Chanson; Fantasia; Chromatic fantasia; Galliard; Intermedio; Laude; Litany; Madrigal; Madrigal comedy; Madrigale spirituale; Mass; Cyclic mass; Parody mass; Paraphrase mass; Cantus firmus mass; Motet; Motet-chanson; Opera; Pavane; Ricercar; Sequence; Tiento; Toccata; Allemande; Canon; Cantata; Chaconne; Concerto; Concerto grosso; Solo concerto; Courante; Fugue; Gavotte; Gigue; Mass; Minuet; Opera; Opera buffa; Opera seria; Oratorio; Partita; Passacaglia; Prelude; Sarabande; Sinfonia; Sonata; Flute sonata; Trio sonata; Suite; Bagatelle; Ballade; Ballet; Classical ballet; Carol; Concerto; Cello concerto; Clarinet concerto; Double bass concerto; Flute concerto; Oboe concerto; Piano concerto; Trumpet concerto; Viola concerto; Violin concerto; Dance; Étude; Impromptu; Intermezzo; Mass; Mazurka; March; Music hall; Nocturne; Opera; Ballad opera; Opera buffa; Opéra comique; Opera seria; Operetta; Overture; Concert overture; Symphonic poem; Singspiel; Zarzuela; Concert Aria; Oratorio; Polonaise; Prelude; Quartet; Piano quartet; String quartet; Oboe quartet; Quintet; Piano quintet; String quintet; Requiem; Rhapsody; Rondo; Scherzo; Serenade; Sinfonia concertante; Sonata; Piano sonata; Violin sonata; Viola sonata; Cello sonata; Flute sonata; Clarinet sonata; Bassoon sonata; Symphony; Program symphony; Choral symphony; Suite; Waltz; Ballet; Neoclassical ballet; Contemporary ballet; Blues; Burlesque; Cabaret; Children's music; Circus music; Concerto for Orchestra; Film score; Funk; Gospel; Jazz; Modern dance; Minimal music; Musical theatre; Neoclassicism (music); Opera; Popular song; Protest song; Rhythm and Blues; Rock; Rock and Roll; Soul; Soundtrack; Swing; Vaudeville; Video game music;

And elements - Introduction, Verse, Pre-chorus, Chorus, Bridge, Conclusion, Elision, Solo, Ad Lib, AABA form...

¹⁶ Acrostic; Alfred Dorn Sonnet; Arabian Sonnet; Aubade; Australian Sonnet; Balassi Stanza; Ballad; Ballad Stanza; Ballade; Beymorlin Sonnet;

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will' but also from the imbalance of the senses, the overpowering of the senses, or underpowering. Only an aberrant art would effectively break up this community, disturb the balance, and so effectively repeat with difference. Any such repetition would not be immediately identified it would be unidentified. A U.F.O. an unidentified foreign²¹ object. And the move of Doxology will always be to re-territorialize this nomadic move, to 'allow', to understand and permit. To grant asylum - literally "an inviolable place." Where to violate is to "to go after, pursue with vigor or desire". Thus already the idea of art as genesis is prohibited in the way

Blank Verse; Blues Sonnet; Blues Stanza; Brisbane Sonnet; Burns Stanza; Burns Sonnet; Busta Sonetto; Byron's Sonnet; Canzonetta; Catena Rondo; Cavatina; Choka; Cinquain; Clerihew; Collins Sestet; Common Measure; Common Octave; Cornish Sonnet; Curtal Sonnet; Cyhydedd Fer Sonnet; Decastich; Decuain; Divino Sonetto; Dizain; Dutch Sonnet; Echo Sonnet; Empat, Empat; Enclosed Triplet; English Quintain; English Sestet; English Sonnet; Envelope Couplet; Envelope Quintet; Envelope Sonnet; Envelope Stanza; Free Verse; French Sonnet; German Sonnet; Ghazal; Glosa; Goethe Stanza; Go Vat; Gothic; Haiku; Half Measure; Heroic Couplet; Heroic Stanza; Huitain; Hymnal Measure; Hymnal Octave; Irish (Celtic); Irish Sonnet; Italian Octave; Italian Quatrain; Italian Sestet; Italian Sonnet; Ivorian Sonnet; John Tee Sonnet; Katuata; Keats Sonnet; Kyrielle; Kyrielle Sonnet; Lai and Virelai; Limerick; Long Measure; Luc Bat; Mabini; Magic 9; Malaysian Sonnet; Mathlish; Mathnawi; Monchielle Stanza; Muzdawwidj; Nocturna; Nocturne; Novelinee; Ode; Octave; Ottava Rima; Pantoum; Pantoum Sonnet; Pathya Vat; Pentastich; Petrarchan Sonnet; Pleiades; Pushkin Sonnet; Quatern; Quintilla; Redondilla; Rictameter; Rime Couee; Rime Royal; Rime Royal Sonnet; Rondeau; Rondel; Rondel Prime; Rondelet; Rondine; Ropalic; Rosarian Sonnet; Roundel; Roundelay; Rubaiyat; Rubliw; Sapphic Ode Sonnet; Sapphic Stanza; Saraband; Saraband Sonnet; Septet; Septilla; Sestet Couplets; Sestina; Shakesperian Sonnet; Shelley Sonnet; Short Measure; Short Particular Measure; Sicilian Octave; Sicilian Quatrain; Sicilian Quintain; Sicilian Septet; Sicilian Sestet; Sicilian Sonnet; Sijo; Soneto Cinco, Cuatro y Cuatro; Sonetto Rispetto; Song That Luc Bat; Sonnet; Sonnetina Uno; Sonnetina Due; Sonnetina Cinque; Sonnetina Tre; Sonnetina Quatro; Soun; Spanish Quintain; Spanish Sestet; Spanish Septet; Spanish Sonnet; Spensarian Sonnet; Spensarian Stanza; Standard Habbie; Stave Stanza; Strambotto (All); Swannet; Tanka; Tennyson's Sonnet; Terzanelle; Terza Rima; Terza Rima Sonnet; Than Bauk; Thomas Wyatt Sonnet; Trijan Refrain; Trinidad Sonnet; Triolet; Triolet Sonnet; Tritina; Triversen; Un-wreathed Octave; Un-wreathed Quatrain; Un-wreathed Sestet; Un-wreathed Sonnet; Vietnamese Sonnet; Villanelle; Villanelle Sonnet; Welsh (Celtic); Wordsworth Sestet; Wordsworth's Sonnet; Wreathed Octave; Wreathed

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of the protection of art, of thought, of thinking from a non identified individual, an outsider, nomad or alien. And this prohibition is by virtue of the good will of the thinker.

3. The third postulate (of The Image of Thought) is recognition. A re thinking of the same. It should follow from above that this recognition is that of the familiar, not of the encounter with the stranger. However the trick in post-modernity via irony is to never allow the stranger any strangeness. This within art even re-cognizes the work as bad art, 'I know what I like', or recognizes it as avant garde, 'of course I can't understand it, it's art'. This double blind is always ahead of any game. In Deleuze's terms it's a repetition without difference, thus art ceases to be able to be creative. The disruption of the senses might be some political event like those of '68, more recent forms of illegal occupation, a transgressive acts of nudity, pornography, mutilation or violence, but this is now consumed. Even the extent of the right to protest is allowed

Poetry; Wreathed Quatrain; Wreathed Sestet; Wreathed Sonnet; Wyatt Sonnet; Ya Du; ZaniLa Rhyme;

¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_art_movements And for each a complex set of criteria.

¹⁸ Difference and Repetition p. 134.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 133 - I should point out that 'identity' is something Deleuze is opposed to.

²⁰ "Dogma is a principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true. It serves as part of the primary basis of an ideology or belief system, and it cannot be changed or discarded without affecting the very system's paradigm or the ideology itself. The term can refer to acceptable opinions of philosophers or philosophical schools, public decrees, religion, or issued decisions of political authorities. The term derives from Greek δόγμα "that which seems to one; opinion or belief" and that from δοκέω (*dokeō*), "to think, to suppose, to imagine". In the first century CE, dogma came to signify laws or ordinances adjudged and imposed upon others..."

²¹ Def. "strange and unfamiliar." I suppose this all feels pretty foreign to you" synonyms: unfamiliar, unknown, unheard of, strange, alien, exotic, outlandish, odd, peculiar, curious, bizarre, weird, queer, funny;"

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by a good will. Recognition – of art – as anything - gives us more than ever the idea of the impossibility of art. And the will (for some) of and for this impossibility. For Deleuze a monster would radicalize and destroy the community of good will, overcome the common and good sense. An art of radical challenge- ‘yawn’? When recently did a riot break out in a concert hall? We either want a tame monster, or are in accord with the authorities²². And even the “justification” for any monstrous act is now that of good will.

“The appearance of the settler has meant ... the death of the aboriginal society, cultural lethargy, and the petrification of individuals. For the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler.”²³

“Not an individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought, but an individual full of ill will who does not manage to think either naturally or conceptually. Only such an individual is without presuppositions. Only such an individual effectively begins and effectively repeats.”²⁴

‘Presuppositions’ here are infinite justifications for an act which render it empty and sterile, already known and identified by any audience before it occurs. So given these presuppositions – Good Will etc. – The Image of Thought - effective beginning and repetition cannot take place. The violence as an act of genuine repetition is the overpowering of sense and the senses, an overpowering of the presupposition of all doxologies, of reason and understanding. In the example of ‘Bad Music’ (Bad Art) to make art is impossible, which is to say to make art is to fail,

²² “Eagles of Death Metal issued a statement about the attacks on November 18, thanking “the French police, the F.B.I., the U.S. and French State Departments, and especially all those at ground zero with us who helped each other as best they could during this unimaginable ordeal, proving once again that love overshadows evil.””

²³ Frantz Omar Fanon – also “, Martin Kramer, who debated Paper on origins of suicide bombing, stated that the motivation for suicide attacks is not just strategic logic but also an interpretation of Islam to provide a moral logic.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_terrorism

²⁴ D & R p. 166

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or to say it is 'bad'. Which is to deny the senses anything, certainly a community, which is to deny community. Now how can one say to others that they deny community! Only by not saying is an individual an individual and not identified as such, as anything – do they cease to have any identity. A music which lacks identity which is not identified as noise or (good) music is bad music.

4. The fourth postulate concerns representation, and the 're' should make for an obvious clue, as above it removes originality in favour of the familiar, but in Deleuze this becomes more crucial. And more complex, for representation has four elements, but all serve (for us) one cause, the denial of difference. And by this the identification of the individual which makes the individual no longer individual but **identified** as part of a good community. The **identified** individual person, **identified** object, work of art... the community of man, of art of the **identified** tradition of music. This is a resolution of the muse. Muse-derivation of muzzle of a dog – which has lost the scent (sense). We now cannot be content with some radical move, like 1968. Being content with 68 is not a disruption at all, but a representation of a revolutionary act. Action is now the impossibility of the act, as of failure, loss and so bad. We cannot be radical.

Deleuze in D&R (published in 1968) still sees difference as some alternative, and he uses Kant's idea of the sublime which forces a violence on the senses, whether by act on others or the self. A violence which promotes discord, the mind blowing power of art or drugs or the 'movement'. Obviously now any such move, from 1968 would be a representation. The state now utilizes shock and awe.

One method to remove recognition, representation, would be to neutralize the 're' as if the thing had never left to be then re-introduced, re-membered, to take the most commonplace and leave it there. The violence of neither aggression or passivity, but of utilization. The conformity which frees the act from re-cognized individual acts. But this in Deleuze's D&R would be doxa. But because of the failure of modernity into post-modernity, the internet, A.I. we can leave thinking in order to transcend thought, not by transcendental empiricism but by a transcendental consumerism. In knowing we are the same we are not, in thinking we are an individual we are not. In creating the not-new we create the new, music, art, consciousness. We – more than Deleuze- do

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not originally create, in any eternal return there is no origin, but we create the same as new via difference. Of course this 'now' is 2016 not 1968, 48 years later... with all the history of those events, the history of the 'event' itself. Deleuze uses the difference back in 68 of Artaud's "Theatre of Cruelty"

"where Artaud sought to remove aesthetic distance, bringing the audience into direct contact with the dangers of life. By turning theatre into a place where the spectator is exposed rather than protected, Artaud was committing an act of cruelty upon them."²⁵

Which **was** once I suppose a valid act in overcoming The Image of Thought. In this century International terrorism (which has its own 'good will') provides this danger for real in any contemporary city. Post 911 Artaud is a safe bet in the humanities campus, provided security is sufficient.

5. Here we have the idea of 'The Postulate of the Negative, or of Error' and of stupidity. Any deviation is reduced to simple error²⁶ in the

²⁵ Lee Jamieson, Antonin Artaud: From Theory to Practice, Greenwich Exchange, 2007, p.2

²⁶ 4xx: Client Error

400 Bad Request The request cannot be fulfilled due to bad syntax
401 Unauthorized The request was a legal request, but the server is refusing to respond to it. For use when authentication is possible but has failed or not yet been provided
402 Payment Required Reserved for future use
403 Forbidden The request was a legal request, but the server is refusing to respond to it
404 Not Found The requested page could not be found but may be available again in the future
405 Method Not Allowed A request was made of a page using a request method not supported by that page
406 Not Acceptable The server can only generate a response that is not accepted by the client
407 Proxy Authentication Required The client must first authenticate itself with the proxy
408 Request Timeout The server timed out waiting for the request
409 Conflict The request could not be completed because of a conflict in the request

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dogmatic 'Image of Thought' into 'Stupidity'. Though now we are made stupid by the complexity of cybernetics²⁷, and now allowed to be stupid by the very technology²⁸. There is always an "App for that." And the very madness of which Deleuze wanted to 'enrich' society with has resulted in the programme of 'care in the community' and the rise of rough sleeping, a big issue. To be stupid now is to think oneself smart. And people do without much concern. Now we all can simply ignore – we become ignorant - ignotus = unknown, strange, **unrecognised**, unfamiliar. We become, we are stupid ***Users***.

410 Gone The requested page is no longer available

411 Length Required The "Content-Length" is not defined. The server will not accept the request without it

412 Precondition Failed The precondition given in the request evaluated to false by the server

413 Request Entity Too Large The server will not accept the request, because the request entity is too large

414 Request-URI Too Long The server will not accept the request, because the URL is too long. Occurs when you convert a POST request to a GET request with a long query information

415 Unsupported Media Type The server will not accept the request, because the media type is not supported

416 Requested Range Not Satisfiable The client has asked for a portion of the file, but the server cannot supply that portion

417 Expectation Failed The server cannot meet the requirements of the Expect request-header field

5xx: Server Error

500 Internal Server Error A generic error message, given when no more specific message is suitable

501 Not Implemented The server either does not recognize the request method, or it lacks the ability to fulfill the request

502 Bad Gateway The server was acting as a gateway or proxy and received an invalid response from the upstream server

503 Service Unavailable The server is currently unavailable (overloaded or down)

504 Gateway Timeout The server was acting as a gateway or proxy and did not receive a timely response from the upstream server

505 HTTP Version Not Supported The server does not support the HTTP protocol version used in the request

511 Network Authentication Required The client needs to authenticate to gain network access

²⁷ The need for technical support!

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6. The privilege of designation in The Image of Thought I will take as the external 'given' of rules and not the experienced nature of living. Thus the life of thinking becomes a set of designated rules (of logic) typified by the use of bland symbols P V Q etc. and the facile examples, All men are mortal, Socrates is a man therefore Socrates is mortal.

"without granting as true the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self identical, without a continual falsification of the world by means of numbers, mankind could not live – that to renounce false judgements would be to renounce life, would be to deny life."²⁹

The fictions of logic are now the metaphysics of technology, the logic of computers. Not an academic game but the ubiquitous form of reason. Of course Deleuze wanted the experience of the event, but these events have now occurred and are only recognised, repeated without difference and given authenticity. To the user of the system none of this need matter. In the sixth postulate we see again the idea of authorities doxa and Deleuze's wish to overcome this, which history in part has achieved. The problematic for 'the artist' if he/she wishes to make art is not to make it new, to shock, but something quite different. If you like, Deleuze has become the doxology of the humanities, and so the 'event' needs to be un-evented. For the time being the commonplace is no longer common and so the site of repetition with difference.

²⁸ Google and Wikipedia! More than Plato's pharmacy and writing – "In Plato's *Phaedrus*, the Egyptian god of writing—Theuth or Thoth—offers King Thamus writing as a "remedy" ("*pharmakon*") that can help memory. Thamus refuses the gift on the grounds that it will only create forgetfulness: for him, it is not a remedy for memory itself, but merely a way of reminding. Writing is thus a "poison" ("*pharmakon*"). In his reading of the *Phaedrus*, Derrida focuses on the "*pharmakon*"—which can also mean philtre, drug, recipe, charm, medicine, substance, spell, artificial colour, and paint—as that which produces a flickering and disorienting play in conceptual/ philosophical oppositions: remedy/ poison, good/ bad, true/ false, positive/ negative, interior/ exterior. According to Derrida, the *pharmakon* of writing itself cannot be reduced to the series of oppositional concepts that it precedes and produces (see *Dissemination* 103)." <http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/pmahon/pharmakon.html>

²⁹ Beyond Good and Evil. p. 37.

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7. In the idea of thought and thinking concepts aim at truth. And A truth. Here the image generates the problem and definitive solution, the problem here is not a real problem, like the teacher who sets a problem for their students already knows the correct answer, the solution. Nothing new is produced by solving such a problem, only a concordance with the teachers already correct answer which was created before the problem as part of the programme of the knowledge already given in the eighth postulate. This is another example of Doxa as opposed to the creation of a new idea. This is the seventh postulate of *The Image of Thought*. Within Deleuze's metaphysics of D&R the 'genuine' novel truths in reality are only ever provisional solutions to infinite problematics generated by the plane of virtuality. A plane which creates intensities which produces events, such as those of 68. Deleuze sees ideas as radical, new, truly creative repetitions but only ever provisional. This is 1968 before the advent of computers and the internet in which any solution³⁰ is always provisional.

8. The whole Doxology of *The Image of Thought* produces the eighth postulate that knowledge arrives at the learning of the pre given, which is not leaning at all. Nothing new is learnt, only the pre existing culture is assimilated rather than knowledge made by the individual, individuals by assimilation of facts are identified as 'selves' in the community. And it is a communal good. And this is a good description of what knowledge has become, not a learning from experience. In French the terms experiment and experience are the same word, so genuine experience is experimental, in which the outcome is unknown. Knowledge in the doxology of *The Image of Thought* is not learnt through experience / experiment, which is dangerous and might fail, but acquired through custom, though already existent tools. One is identified by the community, one's tag, email address – social media account. There is no experiment to find out who one is as from the get-go we are identified. Knowledge is acquired through the already given tools, via access to the knowledge already present in the server 'farms' of the internet. To make a new knowledge would now require the creation of something which does not exist and something not capable of binary encoding and which would not be recognized. The move here is to think the thing in itself without thought, the venture of Speculative Realism and Object Oriented Philosophy which presents the object as

³⁰ Operating system, processor model, application....

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something we can never know, presents the object as the unrepresentable. What is Bad is the use of Google and Wikipedia to present knowledge. This has become the accepted good and proper means. The factuality of knowledge of fact is presentation of facts, not known but just as data, not information. Data which can be regarded as noise, yet to be understood, and made without content so not being able to be understood.

Here ends the eight postulates of The Image of Thought.

In 'Difference and Repetition' the alternative to dogmatic and uncreative thinking, (harmonious thinking using concepts)- The Image of Thought - are *ideas* which arise and overwhelm the good and common sense in violent events. As a strategy it has some difficulties 40 + years later. First, it's now well tried and tested, its become a dogma itself, the 'Make it New!' of modernity is no longer 'new' or radical. Regardless of it being true, and working, or its failure, its continued repetition without any difference renders it dogmatic. OK so maybe D&R's own critique has become dogma, this is not a move which Deleuze sees in D&R as productive but it doesn't invalidate Deleuze's dogma for those who wish to use it. The continued idea of radical progress, new and better experiences can be held despite this "radical progress "now being produced dogmatically. We might describe the later shift in Deleuze's thinking in 'What is Philosophy?' in these very terms - the dogmatisation of philosophy, as well as Art and Science...!

So ideas/ art as overwhelming events may now be a doxa which works, or a method which failed in practice or succeeded only then to become a doxa. But either way - the success or failure of modernism - the success or failure of radical and revolutionary thought and action means either the goals have been achieved or likely as not they will never be achievable. This is the position of post-modernity³¹.

So what is Bad Music other than the Image of Music. What is this image other than the Doxa of music, the un-challenged given of the technology

³¹ I'm aware the term was considered passé almost as soon as it was coined, however historically modernity ended and whatever followed is post, and I'm unaware of any alternative other than 'post-post modernity', 'after theory etc.' None of which have (or can have) anything new or different to offer IMO.

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of the music machine. The un-creative given of the program, the pre-set rendering of sound, the already given pattern. All of these never before have been considered as music as a creative art. Even a music at its most traditional has had to affect difference if only in popular music as a legal requirement. Bad music is music – ‘in-the-last-instance’ – which appears in-the-last-instance from it simply being in-the-first-instance. It is therefore at the same time different to music and music. It is therefore ‘new’ yet not newly created. Neither is it the minimal of music. It is ‘A Priori Music’. A synthetic A Priori, phenomenologically, ontologically, epistemologically and teleologically. And at the same time also transient.

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The Plane of Music and The Plane of Immanence.

In 1991 Deleuze with Felix Guattari produced 'What is Philosophy?' where 'The Image of Thought' and the natures and province of Art, Science and Philosophy are presented.

Like D&R, WiP is not an easy book, but some consolation can be taken from the book's closing summary of the condition of Art, Science and Philosophy. Though I should note a problem remains as to the status of the book and the consolation it offers Art (and Science)! so I will briefly explore these and some other difficulties I have with my reading of the book.

My first problem is the legitimation for Art taking 'liberties' with Philosophy (and the other discipline –Science) that Deleuze and Guattari offer should include the very text of 'What is Philosophy?'. This puts WiP in a strange position. In legitimating Art, Science and Philosophy it seems to make itself an Ur-philosophy, however at the same time it gives the disciplines of Science and Art (and itself-philosophy?) the freedom to utilize any of the other practices. And then in doing so limits this interference of the intervening discipline only to that discipline's own methods, but methods that are attributed to it from philosophy, from WiP, and not from the interfering discipline itself. So WiP prevents any real 'interference', or if it does not, allows the very attribution of these methods to be altered from the non philosophizing discipline. The wish to allow a discipline its freedom yet limit it to philosophy's attribution of its methods seems to deny any real freedom, and so causes D&G very real problems, one of which I'll discuss in more detail below.

This kind of problem is typical of any metaphysics which includes itself and everything else as its subject. This is the metaphysical action of the sort that wishes to define a limit, a horizon to thought or method, but in doing so must be this limit, this impossibility. To encompass everything including itself is like trying to see the edge of ones visual field and so claim to have delineated it. Metaphysics wishes to say what can be said and what cannot be said. However in doing so metaphysics, in deciding what philosophy IS must claim some authority to do this, but from where? An act of meta-meta physics leads to an endless hierarchy. And a metaphysics which always seeks to place itself 'above' is particularly

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difficult for Deleuze who wants no transcendent plane, only a plane of immanence. His solution is to make The Plane of Immanence infinite, but the delineation of an infinity is likewise difficult if not impossible. 'What is Philosophy?' in having other disciplines and other philosophies as its subject is not original, it is Metaphysics, AKA First-philosophy, AKA Theophilosophy, found in Kant but comes fully into play in the historical dialectics of Hegel, particularly in The Phenomenology of Spirit, and continues through philosophy's history up to the present³².

(A recent attempt to avoid this problem, the self-reflective one of metaphysics, is a move made by François Laruelle³³ in defining a "Non-philosophy", or more recently "Non-standard philosophy". This non-philosophy places itself 'outside' of philosophy, and so is able to use philosophy (religion, art, science... anything...) as its subject without reflecting on itself. It avoids the problem of self-reflection, 'what is non philosophy?', by doing non-philosophy from 'The One'. This is a uni-directional move. It places 'The One' as a source outside of philosophical enquiry. Non-philosophy is mentioned briefly in WiP)

Though interesting, the success or failure of metaphysics is not important to 'Bad Music' theory. We only need to see at least that WiP allows art a non-philosophical move even when using philosophy as its subject. Alternatively its description and legitimation of art is problematic. So regardless of the correct interpretation of the philosophy or science in WiP, from the point of view of Art, Deleuze and Guattari must allow Art a free play with Science and Philosophy as do they allow it for themselves...

"The three planes (of Art Science and Philosophy), along with their elements, are irreducible: plane of immanence of philosophy, plane of composition of art, plane of reference or coordination of science; form of concept (Philosophy), force of sensation (Art), function of knowledge(Science); concepts and conceptual personae(Philosophy and

³² There are many examples, Harman on Heidegger, and others – including Meillassoux, Meillassoux himself writes a history of philosophy as correlationism in 'After Finitude', Brassier discusses philosophies in Nihil Unbound..

³³ Deleuze and Guattari tip their hats to a referenced 'non-philosophy' p. 218 which uses amongst others 'philosophy' as its subject.

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philosophers), sensations and aesthetic figures(Art), figures and partial observers(Science)."

D&G state that analogous problems are posed for each plane, but they are more concerned with how these "join up in the brain." They offer examples and conclude-

"In all these cases the rule is that the interfering discipline must proceed with its own methods."³⁴

Where Art may interfere with Science or Philosophy, it is Art's methods and not those of science or philosophy which must in D&Gs terms be employed. Of course *they* (Deleuze with Felix Guattari) have given these methods, as above – 'sensations and aesthetic figures'. My argument with this is that in allowing a discipline to ***interfere*** with another discipline yet prescribing its activity, D&G render any 'real' interference null. They could legitimately say a discipline can ***use*** another discipline but not ***interfere with it***. To allow interference ***must*** allow it to alter or change the discipline. Art should therefore be able to alter philosophy. It isn't stated but D&G also seem to prohibit non-philosophical disciplines (and maybe other philosophies) from interfering in their own methods. This seems dangerously dogmatic. For example the prescriptive definition of Art in WiP not only looks like a one from a higher hierarchy, but creates a very specific difficulty regarding 'conceptual art' in which D&G seem forced to reject conceptual art as art, or at least to reject the idea of a Conceptual ***Artist***. I think conceptual art has now established itself as a phenomena in the art world and I can't think of a move in thinking which successfully³⁵ removes the status of 'Art' from an activity which apparently has this status. So without defending or qualifying conceptual art as art, it seems though it is and has been generally accepted as art – created by Artists. And Art, if it is allowed a creativity, must surely be allowed the possibility of examining and altering itself.

"Conceptual art seeks an opposite determination (to Abstract art) through generalization... it is not at all clear that this way leads to either

³⁴ What is Philosophy p. 216-217. I included the subject in braces to clarify...!

³⁵ There are examples of attempts to do this- all seem to fail.

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to the sensation (as in D&G's idea of what art is or should be) or to the concept (presumably philosophy) because the plan of composition tends to become "informative", and the sensation depends on the simple "opinion" of a spectator who determines whether or not to "materialize" the sensation, that is to say, decides whether or not it is art."³⁶

No reason or grounds are given to support the idea that art must be sensational. And why information, or acquiring it, should not be a sensation? More damaging in my opinion to the rejection of conceptual art is later we see that philosophical concepts are themselves regulated by **taste**. So if D&G reject conceptual art on the basis of taste it's not unproblematic to accept it on the same basis. It might not be to their taste, and despite any sensation or not one seems free to be able to accept it as Art. Attempts to reject objects as art can anyway be unacceptable to some, as I'll indicate.

There are I think many problems here, the nature of information for instance. Information is conventionally not regulated by taste but by its being true. Another problem is the idea that the art work has in its object something intrinsic that makes it art, and this is the product of the artist. Yet another is their refutation of that move in conceptual art. A move which would indeed make anything and everything potentially art. But the 'readymade' addresses and exposes all of these problems and more. The readymade cannot have any intrinsic thing which makes it art, it was not made by any Artist. It is not art because of any sensation, it provides no information, and it doesn't depend on the simple "opinion" of a spectator.

The readymade as well as minimal and conceptual art have obviously caused all kinds of 'difficulties' in modern and post modern art, but to remove these problems by removing these 'difficult' works seems no longer possible or even desirable. D&G give the genus of art the trait of generating sensations- removing art that did not do so would be nothing less than a declaration of works being degenerate, i.e. in the case of conceptual art not generating any sensations. Obviously that's not a very nice move but they still might wish to take it as many others might who see difficulties in modern and post-modern art. And it certainly is a solution, unacceptable to some!

³⁶ Ibid p. 198

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In much of the above and elsewhere in WiP I sense very different moves to those in D&R. In D&R problems were never finally solved, radical disruption is favoured over common and good sense, in WiP we see good sense decided by taste. If Bad Music is validated in D&R it's by its avoidance of doxa, a doxa of creative novelty, Bad Music is strangely validated also in WiP as it certainly isn't 'conceptual' or minimal, and doesn't function as a readymade does in questioning what is art, what is music, for it is a readymade **music**. And I must emphasise that this text doesn't seek to argue for the existence or not of Bad Art or 'Bad Music', they already exist, the status of 'Bad Music' as "being" is not in doubt. I've hinted above at what of course is an extreme form of totalitarianism which would seek to exclude an object already accepted as Art. These acts of exclusion are extremely dangerous and without the guarantee of the total annihilation of these objects are destined to fail. A moot point would be in a far future – heat death of the universe- where all complex thinking is no longer possible, with the idea of 'Art' no longer being possible would those objects accepted now as being art objects lose this status – I think not. Anymore than anything now would be altered by some future event? Once something is made, occurs the problem or exercise here is to discuss (if any) the ramifications. In this case of 'Bad Music'. And in doing so in this instance I'm happening to use Deleuze and in particular the idea of 'Image of Thought'. It – 'Bad Music' could be discussed using other thoughts (ideas or concepts), Laruelle for instance, in which Bad Music might be considered as a Clone of Music and Noise. It might not be discussed at all, it might one day not be possible, but that doesn't alter its ontic status.

My 'interference' will first develop two routes, by examining 'The Image of Thought' as I'm thinking, I wish to show that contrary to Deleuze and Guattari, Bad Music as Bad Art does not have any recourse to their 'plane of composition, force of sensation, or sensations and aesthetic figures...' and secondly the 'image' of music is effective in the very notion of it being Bad –

"Not an individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought, but an individual full of ill will who does not manage to think either naturally or conceptually. Only such an individual is without presuppositions. Only such an individual effectively begins and effectively repeats."

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Maybe not “effectively begins and effectively repeats” because it is ‘Bad Art’, this ‘Bad Music’, a ‘sticking plaster’, which uses commonplace and ‘ready-at-hand’ technologies, aesthetic devices – even fashions – trends - poorly thought through and conceived, ‘who does not manage to think either naturally or conceptually’ never begins but can and does ***effectively create***.

This “‘Bad Art’, this ‘Bad Music’, a ‘sticking plaster’, which uses commonplace and ‘ready-at-hand’ technologies, aesthetic devices – even fashions – trends - poorly thought through and conceived, ‘who does not manage to think either naturally or conceptually’ produces objects with the superficiality of difference, the common place fashion of the frivolous. Bad Music’s capriciousness lies not in its thought, originality or genesis but in its simple reliance on contemporary technology. A technology which does change and continues to (claim to) be ‘new’. A ‘Bad Music’ in just ‘being’ this technology will be identical to this technology. It will not be the Art of solidarity with some concept, or method from WiP for instance, it will not even be an ‘Art’ of orthodoxy, a doxa of ‘Art’, whatever this orthodoxy happens to be- ‘The challenge of history’, ‘The creation of the seminal’, the positing of the questions – ‘what is art?’, ‘what is music?’, ‘what is silence?’ etc. As the technology is empty of all of these, the music which is just this technology will also be empty. Though this description of the proposed failures of ‘Bad Music’ to be genuine ‘Art’, because of its lacking any content, despite this, the manifested product will in fact be identical to genuine ‘Art’, an identical ***clone***. Both ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ music exhibit diversity, novelty and difference. The good will, the good practice of art, the application of problem solving to good thinking, to good art in its solutions has produced a diversity of objects from its diverse ‘solutions’ to its problems. These are solutions to problems that ‘Bad Music’ simply ignores. The diversity, novelty and difference that Bad Art exhibits is just that of technology. ‘Bad Music’ via its use of ever changing technology clones music without the prior decisions about making music and what making music is. We see the same phenomena in the history of art as in the proposed future history of ‘Bad Art’. The very adoption of the alternative to good thought, good practice if it did produce a continual flux of objects and ideas is either no different from the practice of good art and good thinking, or is different and so is ‘effective’ in Deleuze’s terms. It would fail to achieve Art’s given

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dogmatic status in its lack of righteous justification and appeal to good sense and common sense. It would not ground itself in anything like a justification, it is something altogether different by repeating the now given commonplace at hand via its poor conception and production. Whether this is good or bad, by definition a Bad Art will fail a good (or bad) philosophical definition by its being 'Bad'. How this is 'bad' is both in sound, structure, being, form etc. and here in its theory!

Anyone who has read both D&R and WiP will know that the term 'Image of Thought' and the idea of the 'Concept' are radically different in each book. The constitution of the (philosophical) idea in D&R is that it is a transient and dynamic event. In WiP philosophy becomes the creation of concepts. These seeming contradictions can be simply the product of the processes outlined in D&R. The plane of virtuality is a source, a flux of problematics which cause intensities, from which 'answers' as events are produced in reality. These are only temporary events, only transient solutions. In WiP we have concepts on a plane of immanence. Perhaps then philosophy (for Deleuze) avoids becoming dogmatic in its development and creation of such a difference which is the creation of different philosophies. The particular philosophy of D&R avoids becoming a dogmatic solution as the event (of the particular philosophy) and ceases to be of significance or is modified, radicalised or replaced in WiP. This explanation of the difference (in D&R and WiP) risks- implies – that D&R no longer offers anything other than dogma and that WiP only offers a provisional concept of what Philosophy is. It also jeopardizes, or certainly radically changes, the status of historical philosophy³⁷.

If 'Bad Music' can be, and is, described in terms of D&R's 'Image of Thought' – pejoratively, if we examine 'The Image of Thought' in 'What is Philosophy?' 'Bad Music' can be described more positively.

WiP, like much of Deleuze's other work, is a difficult text and a definitive reading may not be possible. Moreover I'm not taking it as a given or a necessity that anyone reading this should have read WiP, but what we

³⁷ The history of Philosophy would become that of Hegel's where it evolves towards an absolute that is the current philosophy and so new philosophy renders the previous philosophy obsolete and redundant, but it itself is then only provisional.

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need is first a very basic sketch of the work before we select in it 'The Image of Thought' to see how it has become something different, not a concept but the organon of concept production in thinking, the instrument of thought which puts it in a more constructive light.

Apart from the obvious title – 'What is Philosophy?' we have already seen that WiP describes (or prescribes) three activities. Philosophy, Science and Art. It claims that philosophy is the creation of concepts, and goes into some intricate detail regarding the creation, internal and external working of concepts and illustrates these from the history of philosophy. It claims that Science derives functions from observation and so is the production of functions, finite descriptions of physical phenomena. Philosophical concepts have no such finite limit or relation to the physical world. Philosophical concepts obviously have relationships in the physical world but these are in the world as objects themselves in the world effecting it via philosophy, art, science, politics, ideology, ethics... as new phenomena of thought- ideas in the world. Art creates affects "the thing or the work of art- is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound or percepts and affects."³⁸ We have already seen how for D&G Conceptual art therefore poses a problem. So I have some reservations on D&Gs description of Art in WiP which I've already touched on, there are others, though these are not central to the idea of The Image of Thought in WiP. I'll show briefly why I think the definition of art in WiP is unsatisfactory in general and how specifically it's of little use to 'Bad Music' and its theory, but that doesn't impinge on our use of WiP's Plane of Immanence.

In WiP art's properties - sensations and aesthetic figures are the force of sensation, arrived at by the force of the artist, it is so qualified, yet this force must be sensed autonomously in the artwork itself. The work of art is 'a bloc of sensations'.

"Percepts are no longer perceptions... Affects are no longer feelings.... The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own. The artist's greatest difficulty is to make it stand up on its own"³⁹

³⁸ WiP. p. 164.

³⁹ Ibid.

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This may well be considered a good description for much of art, and D&G reference many examples, Emily Dickinson, Pissarro, Manet, Turner, Proust, Chekhov, Cezanne... Klee... however the idea that “the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own” is hard to maintain without reverting to a very clichéd view of art, one which privileges ‘western art’ and a certain type of western art at that! D&G describe art and its practice in very dangerous ethnocentric ways. ‘To stand up on its own’ is to say it must be a universal, or deploy a ‘universal’ language. One in which the artwork is autonomous. And this is dangerous because this universality is a description of Western Art, within the tradition of privileged western ‘High Art’. Other cultures and commonplace craft ‘arts’, communal activities shared myths are excluded. Yet in truth privileged western high art can no more exist outside of its context than a ritual or myth of a so called ‘primitive’ art – primitive culture. ‘Great works’ like the Sistine chapel’s murals would not stand up to anyone unfamiliar with its cultural context. It would make no sense, have no affect, certainly not the intended affect on someone from a different ethnographic origin who is not ‘plugged in’ to the context. Surprisingly D&G here are doing nothing other than manifesting a western imperialism of cultural judgement. It is not in the purview of this text to argue this point in detail but here is a salient indicative statement,

“In music, the minor mode is a test that is especially essential...”⁴⁰.

As the minor mode (Aeolian?) is certainly not essential to many types of music, is not found in many types! are these musics rendered less or not music / art for not offering a test or lacking an essential... Of course not. Though art might have been once thought a universal language it is now not so easy to maintain the universality of western art given the knowledge other cultures, of world music and new music in which not all or non of the western conventions and traditions of form (modes) are to be found.

"Clearly any comparison of medieval and modern modality would recognize that the latter takes place against a background of some three

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 165.

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centuries of harmonic tonality, permitting, and in the nineteenth century requiring, a dialogue between modal and diatonic procedure" ⁴¹

Without the pre given context for art (western art in particular!) much art would not be recognised as art, Duchamp's famous fountain is a 'classic' example. Without a cultural context much of literature would be lost on anyone not knowing the contexts in play, or even being able to read. Without knowledge of social taboos, myth and history much of art is lost, religious texts are rendered into literature? and Madame Bovary is incapable of (a shocking) adultery⁴². Whether or not D&G's theory of art stacks up, and I think it doesn't, isn't important here. Prima facie 'Bad Music' would be ruled out. To rule it in (to something) we need to turn to The Image of Thought in WiP.

'The Image of Thought' in WiP is found in the second chapter, 'The Plane of Immanence', and actually IS the plane. The Image of Thought and The Plane of Immanence are one and the same. We have said above that this plane has a resonance with the virtual in D&R, but is in terminology, if not substance, different, though if not the same 'thing' it functions in a similar way. (Strictly The Image of Thought / The Plane of Immanence it is not a thing or a concept.) Before looking at the Image in WiP again it should be emphasised that 'The Image of Thought' in WiP is not that which is found in D&R. The Image is now quite the opposite of itself in D&R where it was the dogma that was opposed to the novelty and disruption of the virtual, the virtual being the source of infinite problems, intensities, which creates temporary solutions - events in the real world and does violence to good and common sense. The Image of Thought in WiP is now more like if not identical to the Virtual Plane in D&R.

The Image of Thought as The Plane of Immanence is a difficult 'thing' to explain, D&G state that it is not a concept, yet it seems to us like one, like an idea! They use various metaphors to describe it, yet it eludes

⁴¹ Samson, Jim (1977). *Music in Transition: A Study of Tonal Expansion and Atonality, 1900–1920*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press .p. 148.

⁴² I can't help also thinking of the idea of Fred Hoyle that an intelligent alien black cloud can't figure humans are sentient until it 'hears' Beethoven's Piano Sonata No. 29 in B-flat major, Op. 106. Unlike Richard Williams the reviewer who mistook an engineer's test signal to be a Lennon and Ono piece!

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description! It is like a desert that can be populated with concepts, it, IoT /Plane, is infinite whilst concepts are finite. A desert or plane however is fairly passive and The Image of Thought is not passive but has infinite movement at infinite speeds, it's also described as fractal. A fractal is the infinite production of variation by an algorithm which is recursive, in that it refers back to itself in generating new patterns- and fractals – and by virtue of self reference these are potentially infinite. D&G also state that The Image of Thought is One, but that there are different Images throughout history. It is like the ground of philosophy, its syntax or rules, the model of thinking or source of new rules.... So for example on the Pre-Socratic Plane Of Immanence (Image of Thought) one thinker could think air as elementary and fundamental, another fire, another earth, fire air and water⁴³. All thinking is derived from a 'generic' image (Plane Of Immanence / Image of Thought)to form particular concepts 'from' this image. And these concepts though derived from the image do not resemble the image, the image is 'generic' or infinite, the concept finite and specific. They are not copies of the image or each other. So Fire is not like Water or like Earth or like the 'image of a fundamental substance' but derives from it. The image is infinite as it has all potentiality for thought. In this example the image is not *a* substance but an 'image of a (*any*) fundamental substance'. No thought can occur outside its plane, or without being constructed from its image. If we take a music system, like 12 tone or the Western Diatonic system this is an (the) Image of Music. Here there are two historical 'Planes' of music, or Images of Music, and in each musical 'works' can and are produced. Like concepts the works of particular pieces of music are separate, different, yet employ the same image. The works are real physical sounds, scores, definite and finite , they do not merge into each other or merge into the Image, and the image itself is not a particular or general 'score' or work. So we could think of the philosophical concept as like a piece of music, or work of art. Within the plastic arts the Image of Art is more difficult to describe, it is the context of the work of art. An art object capable of standing on its own of course would not need any context, but we have seen above that's not a particularly satisfactory idea.

⁴³ Thales = water Anaximenes = air Heraclitus = fire Empedocles = earth, water, air, and fire.

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‘The Image of Thought’ could be regarded as a context and the possibilities of the concepts arising within it.

The Plane is immanent, given here and now – otherwise concepts could not take place, and offers infinite possibilities immediately- the plane – the musical system is present- but unlike The Image of Thought in D&R not fixed or dogmatic. Unlike a musical system⁴⁴ it is not fixed in its form but allows the dynamics of concept creation. The similarity is that the concepts like particular scores or tunes are not of the world, descriptions of the world, but objects *in* the world. A concept *of* the world for D&G is not a concept but a proposition or ‘function’⁴⁵ of science. Concepts as such then resemble art more than science. One could think The Plane of Immanence / Image of Thought in philosophy as Philosophy itself, or the Generic subject ‘Philosophy’ which has particular philosophies located within it. No one particular philosophy is Philosophy as Philosophy itself is potentially infinite. To answer ‘What is Philosophy?’ like answering ‘what is art’ is difficult because the thing in question is infinite so will resist all definition. Never ‘Definite’ - such as ‘what is the ‘greatest number?’ The title then of the book “What is Philosophy?” could refer to the answer that it is ‘The Image of Thought’, (and its contents) though here things get tricky. The Image of Thought not being a concept but having them, just as ‘Music’ is not a musical work but has them within it. So in one sense we have the impossibility of a definitive answer yet have some ‘handle’ on what is music or art or philosophy⁴⁶. Any definite answers to such questions (as ‘What is Art?’ ‘What is Music?’) have and will always have ‘exceptions’, there are many examples especially in Modernity. And such ‘exceptions’ are the ideas or artworks which mark for Deleuze a significant event in D&R, a repetition which is novel and different. But WiP does provide definitions – of Philosophy, Science and Art! and these answers to fundamental questions which relate to ‘what is’, which relate to ‘being’, AKA ontology, are, as we have said above, metaphysics.

⁴⁴ Actually within music the image / plane alters as a consequence of musical development.

⁴⁵ A scientific ‘function’ would be a proposition about the physical world, a theory like Evolution by Natural selection, of a formula or set of equations which model a physical phenomena.

⁴⁶ Of course there is a similarity here to Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘language games’.

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(Something many 20th C philosophers thought impossible or nonsensical.)

Where then do we locate 'Bad Music' in the Image of Music? Within the context of the image as the machine's possibilities it is not a creative actualization of these but more like the image of the machine itself. As music, (not as a definition of idea of music) it is the Image itself. The impossible totality.

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Conclusion⁴⁷.

What are the status of the ideas offered in 'Difference and Repetition' or of the concepts found in 'What is Philosophy?' with regards **to** philosophy. There are problems in both cases, more I think in the latter. Are these texts not philosophical in the sense they map out philosophy? They do offer the **idea** of thinking (philosophically?) in the former and the idea of Philosophy in 'What is Philosophy?' as concept creation on The Plane of Immanence. Deleuze, at least, professes philosophy- or professed it⁴⁸. And the activity of philosophy appears not only to have often been about other disciplines, but about just what is philosophy? Philosophy has always historically had such a 'plane' in which it discussed itself, even if philosophers disliked the transcendent (Notably Deleuze) they proceeded to define a limit and sit on this boundary⁴⁹. All first philosophies, metaphysics, in drawing up their realities described themselves, what they are and what are their limits. Within WiP the 'Plane of Immanence' is presented as not being a concept⁵⁰ but the 'place' where concepts occur – where they take the philosophical 'stage'. This activity or desire to step outside the discipline of philosophy in order to see it as it is, **define** it, yet still **be** the discipline is the very hallmark of metaphysical philosophy. Though philosophy's difficulties with metaphysics might be interesting what is useful to us here is philosophical thinking and how this relates to the arts in general and to contemporary music in particular.

In D&R Deleuze describes the generation of 'events' via intensities as a creative and novel force, one which eludes dogmatism. This 'Philosophical' idea of creation (**original** repetition) is one where the ideas arising from the virtuality (a chaotic sea of possibilities) must avoid doxa and the prevailing good sense. We can see how this idea of creative activity if accepted, or once established, becomes no longer a

⁴⁷ Well this once was but is not anymore – which goes to exemplify a possible conclusion that one can't have a conclusion!

⁴⁸ "...was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris VIII"

⁴⁹ Kant's move was to make a transcendental philosophy...

⁵⁰ "The Plane of Immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts" WiP p. 35.

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new idea, must become itself dogmatic as the violence of its creation subsides and the senses return to equilibrium. Using this schema we can see post 68 the emergence of a dogma of 'revolutionary creativity' which not only becomes a problem for a creative philosophy as outlined in D&R but also a problem for any theories of Art which use this schema. This is the strange dogma of modernity in which to 'Make it New' becomes the cliché, the dogma of modernity, in which 'new' like 'improved' becomes the advertisement of whiteness which is, could be, intensified continually. Even through the miracles of technology this can occur it is no longer a revolutionary 'new', the production of novelty – the new – becomes the dogma of modernity. So we (now⁵¹) **expect** the new. We expect it in Philosophy, Art and Science. We are told in D&R and WiP that this is what philosophy (science and art) is about, yet the expectation denies a true 'new', a repetition which is different and so surprising. In theory we had the idea of the shock of the revolution, the announcement that God is dead, that the author is dead, that everything is dead⁵². This coming of death in theory is no longer new. We **had** the 'shock' of science presenting us with new facts about the world, splitting the atom, discovering or creating ? new particles emerging from experiments such as CERN, but now we **expect** these. In Art we had the shock of the new, action painting, abstract art, pop art, minimalism and conceptualism, the eventual disappearance of the 'Art Object'⁵³ in empty galleries and Silence. Perhaps now a re-materialization but audiences are no longer outraged and riot because of anything 'new'.

If Deleuze's concepts of Art, Philosophy and Science are true, and they needn't be, then any new event should remove the very idea of the 'Events' as being new. Like all meta-philosophies if it is true it ends philosophy, it binds it with its transcendental horizon, yet in Deleuze it proclaims continual invention, of ideas or concepts, but this very idea or concept of what philosophy is stops it from becoming anything new, if it is true, and if it is not? We have a problem or something to engage with, with the idea of 'true'.

⁵¹ It was called post-modernism!

⁵² N.B. Ray Brassier in *Nihil Unbound*- 'Philosophy is the organon of extinction' p. 239.

⁵³ See *Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972* - by Lucy R Lippard.

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Deleuze and Guattari in WiP separate 'concept' from 'function'. The validity or truth of a (scientific) function is its reference *to* the world, whereas the philosophical concept is an object *in* the world. The latter's truth is not the same as the former. In an echo of Wittgenstein's 'don't ask for meaning ask for use', in 'What is Philosophy?' – philosophies products, concepts, become a matter of taste⁵⁴.

This might seem both wrong and shocking especially to 'philosophers' who find philosophy, metaphysics, as being about reality as it really is and not how we might feel about the world, our own predilections. Metaphysics in its transcendental moves sort to define what was Absolutely true, and to be the final arbiter in these matters. This idea of D&G's might also be a problem for modern day philosophers who may see this as making their philosophy 'mere' fiction. Such a pejorative idea about fiction and the arts hides a belief in the superiority of objective truth, as scientific truths. Typical of the Analytic tradition but not found so much in Continental philosophy where literature, Joyce, Eliot, Proust... Kafka, Beckett, Shakespeare and The Bible as resources are to be found as well as other philosophies, mathematics, set theory, non Euclidean geometries and Quantum Physics. Somewhere there appears, certainly in Continental philosophy a shift in the nature of philosophical statements being 'true', the nature of this *truth*. And there still persists

⁵⁴ "The concept's baptism calls for a specifically philosophical taste that proceeds with violence or by insinuation and constitutes a philosophical language within language-not just a vocabulary but a syntax that attains the sublime or a great beauty. " p. 10

"The philosophical faculty of coadaptation, which also regulates the creation of concepts, is called taste." p.44.

"The same goes for the taste for concepts: the philosopher does not approach the undetermined concept except with fear and respect, and he hesitates for a long time before setting forth; but he can determine a concept only through a measureless creation whose only rule is a plane of immanence that he lays out and whose only compass are the strange personae to which it gives life. p. 46

Taste is this power, this being-potential of the concept: it is certainly not for "rational or reasonable" reasons that a particular concept is created or a particular component chosen.." p.46 Et al.

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some vagueness in how statements of philosophy should be regarded, a vagueness about 'truth' might be a good thing, might be more 'true'! To the Anglo-American tradition this might seem anathema where the act of the philosopher was to make things clear. Certainly philosophers once saw their 'truth' as more fundamental, more absolute than even the Laws of Science. Kant embarked on his philosophy to secure a firm epistemological foundation *for* Newtonian science, Hegel saw science as being 'correct' but his Metaphysics as being ***The Absolute Truth***. Somewhere for some the nature of philosophical truth began to change, to the point where D&G can say "Taste is this power, this being-potential of the concept". The nature of philosophical 'truth' if not altered from that of the past, Kant, Hegel et al, is now not clear cut across all philosophies. Maybe this is a cause of criticism levelled at recent philosophy, and from a contemporary philosophies point of view scientific truth can reduce philosophy to scientism or the semantic housework of Wittgenstein. Philosophy can thus no longer say anything about the world unless underwritten by science, and we can see examples of this below. An alternative is to treat the truths of philosophy like those of art, subjective statements about the world. This needn't lessen the value of philosophy but it would no longer be as foundational, and certainly not foundational to science, if it ever was. What becomes of past philosophy which once posited itself as foundational is not that it is invalidated, though its value changes. It becomes a subjective and creative view of reality, which is how it is presented in 'What is Philosophy'. This 'move' in the nature of philosophical truth effectuates the re-evaluation of past philosophy. A philosophical idea of truth which is more like art repudiates the destructive activity within philosophy of writing off other philosophers (as being wrong) and of whole activities- notably metaphysics. But a re-evaluation is needed.

An example:-

Kant's argument in *The Critique of Pure Reason* is that one needs the pure a priori intuitions of Space and Time together with the a priori 12 categories without which experience would not be possible at all. In his Copernican move the nature of reality which we experience is reversed, we do not experience the things in the world but only the internal mental phenomenal world constructed mentally by these categories. He says we can never experience anything in the world without these so we

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can never experience things in themselves, das Ding an sich. This phenomenal experience arising from the concepts and intuitions (by intuitions he means sense experience – perception of the senses) is 'pure' in that it cannot be doubted because without this thought and understanding that is fundamentally true no understanding would be possible. This provides his Transcendental basis for Science. Here is my problem, though Kant says we can never know the thing in itself, there is one thing we (can and must for Kant) know for sure and that is our cognition via these categories, we must know for certain our phenomenal experience based on these a priori categories. Moreover this is the only true 'knowing'. This is a prima facie example of philosophical truth as pure fundamental knowledge. Of Transcendental, (above all other) knowledge.

However though this form of 'knowing' might be true of Kant, how can he be sure that others 'knowing' must be based on this process. To argue that this process works is one thing, this does not mean that no other process would or could not work. If this Kantian process of knowing is the only means of knowledge is it possible to 'know' yet be unaware of this process. Would such knowledge be true knowledge? Suppose I'm not aware of the Kantian process and believe 7×8 is 56, I can believe this to be true but many would argue if I had learnt this by rote I would not **know** it to be true. A parrot can be taught to say "Seven Eights are Fifty Six" and no one could reasonably argue the parrot knew this to be true. For it to be true I would need an understanding of multiplication, or addition, such that I could count up 8 seven times and reach 56 as a sum and so know this to be true because of my understanding. It follows that someone 'understanding' without knowledge of the process – Kant's - would not in fact be understanding at all but arriving at a truth by some other method which was not then pure understanding. Otherwise it could be said that one could know something yet have no knowledge of the basis for such knowledge. So anyone without knowing (or rejecting) the Kantian process prior or after Kant could not in Kantian terms have true knowledge.

Why is for Kant his means of Understanding the only possible one, how can we be sure another is not possible?

How can true and pure understanding occur without awareness of the Kantian process.

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How does Kant have knowledge of other Minds if they are things in themselves of which he prohibits knowledge. Kant may find his knowledge of the world arrives via his categories of introspection but he prohibits his knowledge of other things in themselves which includes other human beings. He can only **assume** they think as he does, to assume they must think as he does is to have certain knowledge of things in themselves via his Transcendental Idealism which he says is not possible. To say that only thinking and understanding can only take place by this Kantian process is not clear or proven, and can't be. To assume others employ his method, (as it is the only means) doesn't prove that the appearance of others understanding isn't just that 'the appearance of understanding' and not actual understanding, as in the case of assuming a parrot knows its times tables, the mere appearance in others of understanding doesn't guarantee it is so. Knowledge – in this case of other minds is not by empirical observation but by his a priori internal deduction. And if we can via internal and a priori introspection know not only that there are others – *for us.* (for Kant) but how these others understand – *in themselves*, why can we not have knowledge of other objects, and thus the latter full blown idealism is justified in these assumptions. To say we can know of others because they are the same as ourself will not do, we have no a priori basis for knowing this. This does not invalidate Kant's argument, it simply means that he describes how he sees the process of his understanding, and that is all, that is his transcendental limit.

He prohibits knowledge of things in themselves, but I'm one of those things. To make an assumption about me is no different in its certain purity of knowledge to making assumptions about humming birds or the electoral system.

However his system remains, and remains valid, but not as an absolutely pure and transcendental truth. It is an immanent detailed and complex description of thought. A description which is a creative and imaginative subjective (ideological emotional socio-economic and historical context) 'portrait' of thinking from the eighteenth century. This re-evaluation gives philosophy- in this case Kant's Critique of Pure Reason- a value which is not subject to being written off by subsequent philosophers any more than Picasso's cubism refutes Filippo Brunelleschi's perspective drawing. And below I will offer the idea

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that philosophical thinking is more than a question of taste, that it is a *technology*.

D&G in 'What is Philosophy?' seek to remove philosophy from the verification used in Science, or a logic of truth propositions. Scientific formulations are tested against reality and observation, are tested against the world, they are formulations of functions which describe the world, propositions of logic and mathematics are legitimated by proofs – mathematical – logical – induction. When D&G make philosophical concepts not dependent on the world or logic but place them as 'objects' in the world and use 'taste' as a mediator, concepts become creations more like works of art than the propositions and formulae of science or logic. This has an important consequence as with 'taste' 'concepts' like works of art are not refuted like a poor or incorrect formulae or scientific theory. A classic example in science is the Copernican model of the universe which superseded and **replaced** the previous Ptolemaic model. Philosophical concepts in WiP are neither replaced by better more accurate concepts or are they made obsolete by other concepts. Obsolescence is a feature of technology (or maybe once was). A painting by Raphael is not superseded by one made by Pollock, an aircraft like the Kitty Hawk is technologically superseded by a Boeing 747⁵⁵.

⁵⁵ Actually within High Modernism there were such views regarding art as being a series of successions each new form by improving on what art is invalidating previous art. Though such theories no longer have much of a following and are simply not the case. One cannot sensibly maintain that Mahler makes Bach and Beethoven redundant, that Pinter renders Shakespeare obsolete! Though it was once thought a sensible case to make – for the value of "Cubism – for instance – is its idea in the realm of art, not the physical or visual qualities seen in a specific painting, or the particularization of certain colors or shapes. For these colors and shapes are the art's "language," not its meaning conceptually as art. To look upon a Cubist "masterwork" now as art is nonsensical, conceptually speaking, as far as art is concerned. (That visual information that was unique in Cubism's language has now been generally absorbed and has a lot to do with the way in which one deals with painting "linguistically." [E.g., what a Cubist painting meant experimentally and conceptually to, say, Gertrude Stein, is beyond our speculation because the same painting then "meant" something different than it does now.]) The "value" now of an original Cubist painting is not unlike, in most respects, an original manuscript by Lord Byron, or The Spirit of St. Louis as it is seen in the Smithsonian Institution. (Indeed, museums fill the very same function as the Smithsonian Institution – why else would the Jeu de Paume wing of the Louvre exhibit Cézanne's and Van Gogh's palettes as proudly as they do their paintings?)

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It follows that if one doesn't happen to like a particular philosophy one isn't bound to accept it, any 'truth' *for us* resides in our choice to see its 'true' as true, but not in the sense that a scientific formula may or may not be true. Many may not like 'the truth' of the Atomic bomb but that will not alter its reality and its effect, its effect is not one that one can decide not to 'enjoy'. If Global Warming was a 'concept' (as in WiP) it could likewise be successfully ignored if it was not to ones 'taste'. "Taste is this power, this being-potential of the concept" cuts philosophy free from Scientism and the verification of philosophy in terms of physical truth or logical propositions, it allows philosophy free speculation. Though not always explicitly emphasised this marks a fundamental change in the nature of philosophy and its 'truths'. If this is so then newer philosophies do not 'invalidate' older ones as in Science or does a logical contradiction refute a philosophical text, though it might present problems⁵⁶. Or do newer philosophies have to render older ones obsolete. Philosophy is not rendered useless or pointless but can now function more as art works do. Once recognized this becomes obvious in 'Continental Philosophy' which pays no particular respect regarding legitimation to science. The recognition explains why the criticisms of Continental Philosophy from Anglo American Philosophy⁵⁷, which does

Actual works of art are little more than historical curiosities. As far as art is concerned Van Gogh's paintings aren't worth any more than his palette is. "

Joseph Kosuth 'Art after Philosophy' p.6.

⁵⁶ In a fictive narrative likewise a plot hole might present problems but not invalidate the work.

⁵⁷ For Example – "Rudolf Carnap thinks Heidegger's contorted sentences malfunction. To illustrate, Carnap quotes snippets from Heidegger's *What is Metaphysics?*:

What is to be investigated is being only and—nothing else; being alone and further—nothing; solely being, and beyond being-nothing. What about this Nothing? ... Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e. the Negation, exists? Or is it the other way around? Does Negation and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists? ... We assert: the Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation.... Where do we seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing.... We know the Nothing.... Anxiety reveals the Nothing.... That for which and because of which we were anxious, was 'really'—nothing. Indeed: the Nothing itself—as such—was

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delimit itself by logic and science, fail to have any significance or purchase on the texts, ideas, concepts, as presented in Difference and Repetition, and via the ideas in D&R and WiP, and in 'Continental Philosophy' in general. Contemporary philosophy such as Speculative Realism is not a matter of logical or scientific exposition or verification dependent on a 'scientific' interpretation of facts⁵⁸, even if scientific 'facts' are found in these texts, or are they falsified by logical error even if these are also found in these texts⁵⁹. Rhetoric can replace Logic, and aesthetics can become a 'first philosophy' as in Object Orientated Philosophy⁶⁰. However if 'facts' do appear in philosophy, if judgement of them becomes aesthetic, we are placed as readers in a position where we can simply choose on the basis of 'taste' not to accept them. I doubt if this is quite what all contemporary philosophers wish, perhaps they are OK with this, but at times there seems quite a fervent exchange about who is right and who is definitely wrong⁶¹. It kind of gives one

present.... What about this Nothing?—The Nothing itself nothings. (Heidegger as quoted by Carnap 1932, 69).

This paragraph, especially the last sentence, became notorious as a specimen of metaphysical nonsense." <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nothingness/>

⁵⁸ "But from my point of view, this Higgs-Boson is a kind of hysterical symptom of a correlationist view." <http://iam.benabraham.net/2012/12/transcription-highlights-from-timothy-mortons-qa-session-after-on-entering-the-anthropocene/>

⁵⁹ See p. 53 In After Finitude.

⁶⁰ "Aesthetics is first philosophy. This phrase is meant not just as an improved reading of Levinas, but as a research program for contemporary philosophy as a whole." Graham Harman. <http://www.nakedpunch.com/articles/147>

⁶¹ From Graham Harman's Blog-

"I don't think this is right. In fact, it has the status of logical fallacy."

Howles then makes a rhetorically unwarranted move, saying this:...

Again, Howles offers no valid citation that would support the watered-down reading of Latour, Or consider as well Latour's even more controversial claim that it's "anachronistic" to hold that Ramses II died of tuberculosis, since tuberculosis was only identified much later in human history. Latour got himself

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free play philosophically? This might be so free it becomes arbitrary, though I think this is not actually the case, which I'll come back to below.

The model or schema of Aesthetics is not a simple matter of taste. There is, or more correctly was, more than the aesthetic of taste in Art. The history of Art was not just the expression of aesthetic taste but was the development of newer forms on the basis of some telos, in modernity to 'Make it New', in 'Truth to Materials'. An aesthetic of truth rather than taste. And justification and evaluation considered how the work of art developed themes, ideas, demonstrated something new and more vital about art. Which explains the occurrences of bottle racks, urinals, silences. The aesthetics of 'truth' which led to the investigation of the nature of 'Art' itself in conceptualism where philosophy itself was discarded by 'Art after Philosophy'.

This aesthetic of truth in modernity reached a crisis, perhaps just as it did in philosophy witnessed by the various "ends of" metaphysics etc. This kind of art is over – ended in the 'nonsense' and implosion of conceptualism exemplified in the kind of ideas expressed by Kosuth. A 'Modern Art' which has given way to a Post-Modern Art of Sensation⁶². AKA an Aesthetics more like that found in WiP, Taste, Rhetoric⁶³... once this is on the table 'making it new' is no longer new. Making becomes just difference which is not vitally different, and repetition as repetition of the same. And anyone interested in the arts will notice this 'event'

into quite a lot of trouble with the Alan Sokals of the world by making claims of this sort."

<https://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/>

⁶² Sensation was an exhibition of the collection of contemporary art owned by Charles Saatchi, including many works by Young British Artists, (YBAs), which first took place 18 September – 28 December 1997 at the Royal Academy of Art in London and later toured to Berlin and New York.

⁶³ "Realist Magic(Tim Morton's) doubles down on a rhetorical strategy frequently adopted by Harman: the deployment of a style so effusive, so strenuously goofy and flippant, that anyone who engages the work closely enough to criticize it will (hopefully) appear stuffy and obtuse: such pedantic critics will seem to have missed out on all the anxiously projected fun".
http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia17/parrhesia17_brown.pdf

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occurred during the twentieth century. The difficulty, one I have, is that contemporary philosophers and artists still (at times) seem to claim the status of 'making it new' and of stating facts as much the same kind of truth (or more) as those propositions of science and mathematics⁶⁴. Though I doubt if such claims if they are serious will be taken seriously....for long. The situation in Art as in Philosophy is one of re-evaluation in the light of the modern / post-modern paradigm shift. The shift from shock of the revolutionary truths of modernity into the taste for post-modern sensations.

The double bind is that if we accept these ideas in Deleuze, we should reject them as dogma, and yet in so doing we cannot then do anything new, even if new is doing something old. Rather than allow thought its vitality it prevents the vital, it becomes the last philosophy, like much of philosophy always claimed, in D&R's case because to change it has become dogma. If philosophies become 'just' texts whose value is aesthetic and a question of taste, if being becomes flat, if one is allowed to spin anything from anything, meaning soon disappears and once that does and the excitement of the rhetoric is all, then the danger is that this soon becomes nothing more than noise. And the criticisms of Speculative Realism make this point⁶⁵. Maybe the beautiful noise of a Jackson Pollock, or a Morton / Harman riff - but still noise. That is contentless image.

However this is not the full picture, something is different not in these texts but in the plane in which they are constructed. This difference is technology. Technology has played its part more and more in the twentieth century in transforming the arts and more recently in transforming philosophy. Technology's impact in the arts is obvious, generated through recording, sound and vision, film and television whole new art forms as well as promulgating older ones in new and

⁶⁴ "You could explode a thousand nuclear bombs and you would not reveal the secret essence of the cinder block. You could plot the position and momentum of every single particle in the block (assuming you could get around Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle) and you wouldn't discover the withdrawn essence of the block." Tim Morton *Realist Magic*.

⁶⁵ Ibid 61, 62 & see

http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia18/parrhesia18_clemens.pdf

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more universal ways. What is particular in philosophy and the occurrence of such phenomena as Speculative Realism and Object Oriented Philosophy was the post-modern technology of the internet. In philosophy the contemporary move in Speculative Realism grew from a conference held at Goldsmiths College, University of London in April 2007 via the internet, blogs and Youtube video clips, via print on demand publishing and pdf distribution. Texts written on word processors in coffee houses or in airport lounges are compiled by trawling the internet, Google is a tool for poetry⁶⁶ as well as philosophy, and Wikipedia provides the required facts within seconds anywhere. We then get texts – books, blogs and web sites rich in these images. The marvel is the ease of production and coolness of presentation. It is this which is truly new. The ideas might be old, and we find authors who see that Plato is as valid as Wittgenstein, more so in non hierarchical thinking if it's to ones taste. The something 'peculiarly' new in this event is the technology. Though post-modern technology is itself peculiarly 'new' because unlike twentieth century technology, po-mo-technology is often new in non-technological ways. It's new in its 'style' more than in its function. Po—mo technology isn't about a word processor being better technologically than a typewriter, but that the current version is cooler than the previous - Word 2016 is cooler than Word 2013- the iphone 6 is cooler than the 5... and so on. A word processor is still a word processor, a computer game still a game much the same as it was ten years ago. Difference in the technologies, resolution, image quality have declined not increased in the last decade. This technology is 'improving' and developing much more along the lines offered in WiP by D&G for the philosophical concept, it is improved in its 'taste'. The production of technology now relies as much on taste and aesthetics as it does on function. There are many examples, the iphone is almost perfect. Brand is important, the brand of the object, and that is where criticism of S.R., OOO and OOP is mistaken. OOO is not a philosophy of the truth, it's a philosophy of a style, of a taste for a 'brand'.

"Coining specific names for philosophical positions helps orient the intellectual public on the various available options while also encouraging untested permutations. If the decision were mine alone,

⁶⁶ Flarf poets like Nada Gordon, K. Silem Mohammad, and Gary Sullivan, who often use Google search engine results as a primary text to create poems that are intentionally "bad" or "inappropriate."

<https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/text/brief-guide-conceptual-poetry>

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not only would the name 'speculative realism' be retained, but a logo would be designed for projection on PowerPoint screens, accompanied by a few signature bars of smoky dubstep music. It is true that such practices would invite snide commentary about 'philosophy reduced to marketing gimmicks'. But it would hardly matter, since attention would thereby be drawn to the works of speculative realism, and its reputation would stand or fall based on the inherent quality of these works, of which I am confident."⁶⁷

Harman has subsequently coined the term 'Object Oriented Ontology', OOO, derived from Object Oriented Philosophy, his previous term. OOO is firmly established as a 'brand' with Harman as making the decision and confident of the quality of his companies product.

The Plane of Immanence which generates ideas, concepts and events, is now technology, that and Philosopher 'Personae'⁶⁸. The contents that probably are OK⁶⁹ or the subject are no longer the agent or provocateur. Contemporary philosophy has content. Content is not important, what is, is the (image of) technology and image of Philosophical 'Personae' which allows this production. The criticisms of this new philosophy of the likes of OOO in its seemingly flippant – riffing – and perhaps incorrect or not descriptions and correspondences, metaphors with and from science, fail to locate the actual subject or better (sic) object of

OOO. It's this setup that is **'liked'**  by the contemporary OOOish philosopher and their audiences. Contemporary philosophy fills itself with stuff, but the stuff is that which the technology already provides on the internet and in the cool software. The real material of OOO and the **"like"** of it is its technology... the slickness comes from the confidence in the technology, the fetish of the technology and the Personae. It's cool to be sitting in an airport lounge with an Apple Mac Book Pro and writing a book to be published while on route to a

conference that will appear on . It's cool not because of

⁶⁷ The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism re.press 2011

⁶⁸ Chapter 5 WiP.

⁶⁹ to the extent of being copied from Wiki or The Stanford Encyclopaedia...

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the air conditioning but because the technology that is at your fingertips. The technology of the Mac and the airport lounge, provide everything you need. The contents, old philosophy, modern physics, global warming, cosmology, QM theory... Set theory...these lists are long, long Google sessions which make new publications of OOO, Conceptual Poetry, Blogs, tweets and facebook pages. OOO is the new metaphysics because it is the generic 'meta' "brand" which is the image of all the other Mac Books in coffee bars, break out areas, railway cars and hotel lobbies where sales meetings, curriculum programmes, political and social lobbying are 'eventing'.

So what of music, well 'Bad Music'? Is it just the aesthetic of the technology, of the gear, a gear fetish, brand image and Personae?

Yep! - well perhaps not...

This was going to be the end of the piece, a glib remark about some synthesisers I'd been messing with. The idea was that technology (as objects) is more the creative force in music and perhaps in recent philosophy than the artist's or philosopher's intention or thought. And maybe you can stretch this and see how the development of the orchestra affected composition, or the use of amplification and electronics affected both avant garde and popular movements in music and art. You can't have Power Electronics without electronics. The creation of a bourgeoisie, middle class, together with better communications of the industrial revolution were part of the romantic movement in philosophy and art. Without an industrial revolution you can't have Marxism? And other examples come to mind, civilization being the result of the plough, a technology.... I remembered a TV series of the 1970s, 'Connections', which used this idea of the connections between technologies and their causes, which to save effort I've just pasted the Wiki article as a massive endnote.¹ (It seemed appropriate to let the technology do the work for what comes next.) It still might seem that these technologies are all well and good but the real genius is in their use, and it was and is human intelligence and genius which creates the technology in the first place and not the other way around.

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Here is my Copernican move⁷⁰. Maybe thought itself was the product of technology, thought was the product of an object, and I don't mean the human brain. I mean the 'revolutionary' idea that 'technology' created the thinking brain and not the usual idea that it is thinking that creates technology. We could argue that music is the result of technology, it was and certainly is an influence. It might be difficult to argue that it was much more than an influence. An even more difficult move is to argue that technology itself does not just account for music but for thinking itself. This seems a ridiculous idea, and it wasn't even my idea.

It has the qualities of the Copernican move of reversal, it has the theme of the seemingly absurd ideas generated by 'death of.. in the line of 'Death of.... of the Author...Art The Novel... Humanity.. and other seeming absurdities found in Post-Modernism⁷¹ where the normal direction or situation is reversed - a 'death' of thinking needed to understand the origin of the creative thought...

It seems the ability to think as we do came from a basic technology which we certainly didn't invent and was more likely accidental...

"Gorillas, orangutans and chimpanzees maxed out their calories with various combinations of big, strong bodies and brains containing 20 to 40 billion neurons. Those brains consume around 9 percent of the total calories that they burn – which means they must spend up to eight hours a day foraging.

⁷⁰ Let the technology do the thinking- It always HAS!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copernican_Revolution_%28metaphor%29#The_22Copernican_Revolution_in_philosophy.22

⁷¹ "Il n'y a pas de hors contexte,"...J.D. "Let us accept the diagnosis of "our brave scientists" at face value and take it as a proved fact that Ramses died of tuberculosis. How could he have died of a bacillus discovered in 1882 and of a disease whose etiology, in its modern form, dates only from 1819 in Laënnec's ward? Is it not anachronistic? The attribution of tuberculosis and Koch's bacillus to Ramses II should strike us as an anachronism of the same caliber as if we had diagnosed his death as having been caused by a Marxist upheaval, or a machine gun, or a Wall Street crash." Bruno Latour.

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Humans, in contrast, sport brains packed with 86 billion neurons- and we devote a whopping 20 percent of our calories to feeding our heads. We can afford such extravagant caloric luxury, Herculano-Houzel believes, only because our species developed ***a unique technology***: the cooking fire.

Around 1.5 million years ago our ancestors began using fire to transform food. "That allows a jump in the amount of calories that you can get from your food that no other practice can achieve," Herculano-Houzel says. Cooking makes it easier to digest plant foods and to extract calorie-dense fat from animal carcasses- for example by stewing bones to extract marrow... around the time our human ancestors conquered fire, they also finally broke through the caloric barrier and jumped from brains of perhaps 40 billion brain neurons (*Homo habilis*) to 60 billion neurons (*Homo erectus*) , and finally to 86 billion. Were it not for cooking, she says "we would not be here".⁷²

So the idea of intelligence creating technology is just an illusion. This is far too much for this text on electronic music. An object – the cooking pot – or fire - made intelligence. Objects came first, and hindsight hides this event. It's maybe difficult to accept this, even in the quote the ghost of 'thinking first' is present "our species developed ***a unique technology***:" – but the facts run counter to that, the ability to develop technology can't come before the big brain is produced by the technology – fire.

Universities are technologies (objects) which create scientists, philosophers and Science, philosophical thinking, and all the other intellectual stuff, art, music ... literature... and now the newer technologies will create new art, philosophy and new societies, new people. The Plough made civilization possible... Telescopes made Modern Astronomy and Astronomers... without the Santa Maria, Pinta & Nina no colonization of America...! ("the carrack was one of the most influential ship designs in history")... Evolution theory was made by HMS Beagle... The Steam Engine made Marx and Marxism.. (Objects rule!) Technology not only provides what we think but how we think, the 'big idea' in recent philosophy is 'flat ontology' – but isn't that just

⁷² Scientific American Volume 24, Number 4, Winter 2015 p. 111

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distributed processing and the 'mesh' framework of the internet where no node is privileged over any other?⁷³

This may seem stupid, surely we use things, we have a problem and so use things (technology) to help us out. We have a problem and we think and then invent stuff to solve it. "our species developed ***a unique technology***:" The whole idea of existentialism is that things like hammers and tea pots have essences, were designed for a use, unlike humans. But I don't think it works quite like that. Tools for instance seem made for a purpose, but is that how it started, someone thought how killing things was problematic so thought up using a rock or a spear – why not go straight to a hunting rifle? Just like being cold so someone thought up fire not air-conditioning, moving stuff was difficult so they thought up the wheel and not the 4x4. An alternative would be that someone watched a rock or log roll down a hill, or was playing with a rock, the rock had Harman's allure about it, and in playing with it, holding it they, and so we, discovered its smoothness, or better it disclosed smoothness to us, it disclosed its weight, its ability to roll, and if we held it and hit something or someone they went down like nine pins. Or someone played with a stick, poked it in the ground, bent it and noticed its suppleness. The idea of poking something with it came from its pokability not from any idea of poking or the need to. From this tools for hunting, spit roasting etc. developed. Messing with slimy mud then feeling its malleability, its ability to hold water, accidentally burning it and seeing it change into something different. That seems more reasonable than deciding to 'fire' a clay pot. Once the objects reveal their properties to humans, humans use them. We maybe thought we were smart at inventing spears and hammers, but we didn't invent rocks or sticks. Technology occurs by noticing the qualities of stuff in the first place, or better the stuff forcing, or persuading and charming us with its

⁷³ "Terminology invoking "objects" and "oriented" in the modern sense of object-oriented programming made its first appearance at MIT in the late 1950s and early 1960s ... In the environment of the artificial intelligence group, as early as 1960, "object" could refer to *identified* items (LISP atoms) with *properties* (attributes)." This seems to imply object thinking for computer science arose from the attributes of the language – *the object* and not the other way around.... "Graham Harman coined the term Object Oriented Philosophy, knowingly borrowing it from computer programming," – but its origin was not an idea but a property / attribute of a *thing*.

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properties. OK once we get going and given the bigger brain we can get thinking, but the whole thing came from the objects which we then used. Right up to date, computers were never intended to write documents, design aircraft or share pornography. They were accounting machines, and the origin of that goes back to cards for weaving, and weaving through messing with the properties, being charmed by grasses and tufts of wool. We now know that the properties of objects can be useful, **they** taught us that, we go looking for them to solve problems, but even today objects do the work, they push their properties on us when we were not looking for any particular solution.

"John Bardeen and Walter Brattain at AT&T's Bell Labs in the United States performed experiments and **observed** that when two gold point contacts were applied to a crystal of germanium, a signal was produced with the output power greater than the input."⁷⁴

No one **first** wanted a non stick frying pan – or microwave oven.

"PTFE was accidentally discovered in 1938 by Roy Plunkett.."

"in 1945 the specific heating effect of a high-power microwave beam was accidentally discovered by Percy Spencer, an American self-taught engineer from Howland, Maine. Employed by Raytheon at the time he noticed that microwaves from an active radar set he was working on started to melt a candy bar he had in his pocket."

It's like the scene at the beginning of the Kubrick film '2001' where the Ape learns to use tools which result in manned spaceflight, only there is no black obelisk doing the teaching, the bone 'reveals' its sensuous properties to the ape, it's the bone not the obelisk Alien / God doing the teaching.

It's quite funny to think of the Science fiction of the Terminator and the Matrix, "the rise of the machines", the scary idea that technology will take over from humanity when in fact technology has been in charge right from the 'get go'.

⁷⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor>. They observed what the crystal was doing.

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Technology is not the same as science or logic, science and logic use methods, techniques, in technology the materiality of the object encounters us. Technology – its objects – are not validated by the same criteria as those of logic and science. Logical propositions are refuted or proven. The Scientific proposition, hypotheses or functions... are falsified by experiment and empirical evidence. Technologies on the other hand in some cases become obsolete, but obsolescence isn't the same as refutation. Or is one technological device necessarily better, more 'true' than others. There are many examples, computer technology uses different processors, automobiles use different types of engine and transmission, aircraft use different materials and propulsion systems, even mundane things like vacuum cleaners and garden tools are different in construction yet function in similar ways or for a similar purpose. Obsolescence is not a refutation, the technology of the Kitty Hawk still flies. Sun dials still indicate the time. CPM computers still compute. Fountain pens still write and are on sale. Older technologies are still employed, not only for pleasure, horses for riding, vintage cars, and sailing boats, but can also remain useful and in certain circumstances perform better than newer technologies. We still have propeller aircraft, and garden spades. Some technological objects have ceremonial or sporting use, swords, armour, even bows and arrows. Some combine various elements of old and new technologies, mix use with allure in such objects as the electric guitar. Aesthetics and technology all help define and shape the object.

In Deleuze and Guattari's 'What is Philosophy?' – 'taste' "regulates the creation of concepts", if we add 'technological use' we arrive at a far less arbitrary regulation, however one that is not an exclusive regulation. We can use an analogy from computing to show how such philosophies can work and avoid extreme relativism. D&G *reduce* the regulation of philosophies to taste, but it need not be as subjective as this. Philosophies could be regarded like computer operating systems. They could be mechanisms, technologies, for thinking in which style and taste can still function. In computing taste and style certainly do play a very large part in the technologies of creating and marketing an O.S. Apple has a distinctive brand and image as does the more mundane O.S. of Windows or techie outsider of Linux, ubuntu or command line operating systems. A C.P.U. has to have an operating system and this O.S. has to function, and these functions at a low level are not just opinions or matters of taste. Though we can choose a particular O.S. on the basis

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of taste or something else functionality is also required. Operating systems function differently... but without invalidating other Operating Systems⁷⁵.

⁷⁵ Graham Harman deliberately first coined OOP as Object Oriented Philosophy which was an acronym he knew was normally applied Object Oriented Programming. OOP in computer science is not the only programming methodology, there are others, and supporters of these as well as OOP. They exhibit different properties and uses.. The poorest sort Algorithm is the Bubble sort, far slower than the Quick Sort, Binary tree etc. however its advantage is not speed but simplicity, and a quirk in that it's one of the fastest methods of 'sorting' an already sorted list. i.e. knowing a list is sorted.

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The end of Thought.

Thinking is a technology not a science. Thinking as a technology solves specific problems or aids or creates specific tasks. From bows and arrows through to skate boards, it doesn't orient itself to the truth as a universal or absolute truth. One has preferred technologies, but preferences need not be objective, there are debates about technological solutions, as well as obvious objective comparisons. Nuclear weapons are more deadly than bows and arrows, pan frying can be preferable to grilling.... 9mm parabellum rounds have differences to .45 ACP calibre⁷⁶... But with technology it's possible to have different technologies which achieve or attempt to achieve the same results and these results have a limited practicality about them, a less than general purpose. Though technologies may be advertised as the 'best possible' there are as far as I know no 'absolutes' other than a Vodka which maybe preferred to others or even to gin or a fine malt.

Thinking philosophically certainly can have a style – a look and feel, but it can and does also have substance. In my opinion to be effective it must have a substance. Though this substance doesn't have to be the absolute a priori correctness of a complete and totalizing system. In fact I don't think it can be. The desire for Absolute Truth, Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Understanding has problems as does any totalizing absolute, and with this the inherent contradictions which follow. If I say no one philosophy is better than another my statement 'no one philosophy is better than another' sits in judgement, or is flawed with its own assertion. It would be better to say there are different philosophies and different measures for judging them. This is very unlike Science which tends to have more formal methods of proof or judgement, and is certainly different to mathematics. Scientific theories now proven to be not true are no longer taught as science, this is not the case with philosophy. The very current relevance and interest in philosophy of philosophical works well over 2,000 years old should be an indication, as far as I know in modern astronomy a detailed understanding Ptolemy's concept of the universe isn't taught. I can't see 'taste' being an acceptable criteria for a proposition of science or mathematics, it can be for art and it seems also philosophy. Others object, Kosuth for instance

⁷⁶ 9 mm firearms typically hold more rounds than .45, but .45 are more damaging to any target. There was and still is a debate about this in the U.S. military and elsewhere... Just Google 9mm vs .45.

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once saw art as a formal system of tautologies and nothing to do with taste. There are numerous ways of interpreting art and philosophy. Many of these may well argue for the inferiority or downright incorrectness of others but they cannot provide, it seems, a generally accepted rigorous framework for doing this. What I'm sort of presenting in here allows for more of a free play in art and philosophy. This is not however relativism – anything goes – what is in play in both 'disciplines' are scopes for thinking, feeling, structuring or de-structuring. Personally I hate the current idea for any work which seems unintelligible as the 'well it poses the question what is...?'. I think this process in philosophy as it certainly was in art is fatal. Art and Philosophy are creative synthetic activities in WiP, and I agree. More than taste they help us orient ourselves to the world, and like a cubist picture the more views the more the poetry of reality is revealed and the less it is a fixed point photographic repetition. It's why Plato and Rembrandt might still be relevant, but perhaps only relevant to some. The Tractatus established 'rules' for meaning not only disastrous for Continental Philosophy but even for itself. Wittgenstein was well aware of this more perhaps than others within logical atomism / positivism. "Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them (my propositions) as nonsensical... (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it)." If only scientific propositions and logic (including mathematics) are allowed – then this very attitude – idea – of the Tractatus or any and all philosophy, along with art and literature and diaries, dictionaries, shopping lists bus timetables, The Bible, blackmail notes and love letters become 'nonsense'. The Tractatus itself is neither empirical science or a tautological logic.

Within Object Oriented Ontology / Philosophy – objects hide even from themselves their essence, so is OOO itself an object? and if so it must have hidden depths-

"You could explode a thousand nuclear bombs and you would not reveal the secret essence of the cinder block. You could plot the position and momentum of every single particle in the block (assuming you could get around Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle) and you wouldn't discover the withdrawn essence of the block." Tim Morton Realist Magic.

Obviously the complexities of OOO and a cinder block are unknowably identical! In OOO? Furthermore all other objects including philosophies

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qua 000 have this hidden essence, how then can we as 000 philosophers offer a reasonable criticism of something of whose essence is a mystery? As I said above any metaphysics has this problem of delineation. An old rouse in philosophy until recently was to bring in God. There are many examples, Descartes starts with doubt, then developed clear and distinct ideas from this of which God is one, who then guarantees the whole project. Actually in the cogito his certainty is from thinking not doubt, anyone whose had sufficient vodka or similar will have been confused, doubted plenty and been unable to formulate a clear and distinct idea, or worse (for Descartes) been able to form clear and distinct ideas, such as being perfectly safe to drive. We could be the delusions of a drunk demon? Bishop Berkeley rids us of Universals as we never see any. Berkeley holds that there are no such mind-independent things, that, in the famous phrase, *esse est percipi* — to be is to be perceived. Things cannot exist when minds — human minds don't perceive them, the room one has just left, the tree in the forest falling in perceptual absence are problems as they then blink into and out of existence as they are perceived then as they are not. It — he — solves this by having God perceive everything all the time. However one assumes that he (Berkeley) doesn't perceive God (and certainly not all the time) so God should be consigned to the dust bin with the universals. O.K. the citation I'm plagiarizing has — "or to perceive" — which gets Berkeley off the hook — God is perceiving so exists without needing to be perceived. But how does Berkeley know this? Not from perception, from an assumption that there is a thing — God — which perceives. This seems to arise not from any perception, so a perceiving thing simply is — even if not perceived! Trees are perceived, but they don't exist when not perceived, or do they perceive — how we or Berkeley knows trees don't perceive but God does is difficult to 'perceive' — I can't perceive either. All the things in the world which require perception to exist do not perceive in themselves. How do we know this? Well the only answer I can think is that we don't perceive them perceiving, but this goes for God also. Neither do I perceive God perceiving or do I perceive anything else or anyone else perceiving, I make an assumption others perceive from my perception but that's no proof and an assumption isn't a perception. If I'm allowed to assume I can have unobserved rooms and trees falling in forests as well as abstract universals. His fox is shot? Graham Harman adds to this — not saying Berkeley is wrong, some philosophers tend not to do this of old famous dead philosophers — he says "immaterialism" (Berkeley's term

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for his philosophy) is simply no longer fashionable, other old philosophers might be –in Harman’s case Heidegger. God drops from the picture post Hegel (Kierkegaard et al excepted) and is replaced by philosophers who seek to limit philosophy by a critique not only of previous philosophers but of Metaphysics itself. The latter can be found in Hume and Kant, Hegel prefers ‘Science’ of logic to Metaphysics... and so we have the problem of on what metaphysical branch the philosopher sits on to saw off the metaphysical branch. Meillassoux cogently and rationally argues all is contingency⁷⁷, he develops this to establish chaos as being fundamental and mathematics the only reliable guide to certain knowledge. In part he sees this as freeing philosophy from self doubt, (and correlationism) and so again able to tackle the big questions and attack fideism and religious fundamentalism. However he then proposes, given contingency and chaos, a future God, obviously he says God isn’t here now. A God to come – to be hoped for, who will come and make good all the evil, and bring justice to the dead who have suffered much and are ignored⁷⁸. Here he must limit this God’s potency to being subject to time, our time, as an obvious move on the part of an omniscient future God would be to go back in time and stop these bad acts in the first place before they occur– these bad acts to people which requires justice. This of course we know hasn’t happened as we are aware of injustice. The idea of some future God resurrecting the dead to give justice seems odd, if not cruel. Why not let those who suffered ‘sleep’, to bring them back with their memories seems very cruel, to bring them back without them - pointless. To bring them back and then what, bring back those who did this evil and punish them? Would that erase or compensate the suffering – now remembered? Or compensate them some other way, with some blissful afterlife, should this bliss come with awareness of why it’s given or not and how much and how long is sufficient, if finite what happens then – back to oblivion? Eternal bliss and or eternal damnation seems an unjust ‘reward’ to a temporal misdemeanour no matter how evil, the act was finite and to a finite

⁷⁷ He addresses the obvious thought that the world seems very non contingent with some dubious use of statistics. That one can't give odds where infinity is involved – though the likes of the Physicist / Mathematician John Barrow can. As does atomic theory of half life of radioactivity and the Calculus..

⁷⁸ "Spectral Dilemma," in *Collapse*, vol. IV : Concept Horror,

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person or group⁷⁹. Further how do we know why the evil doer did what they did, were they free to do this or as often the case in part a victim themselves? How if those who did the evil argue it was not their fault? The divinity might know their minds and so judge differently. But how can a divinity know another's mind, my mind for instance. A divinity knowing me would be 'A divinity knowing me' – which I can tell you is not me! A God might forget himself and be me for awhile, but then have the memory of being me, but that isn't me either⁸⁰. To leave those who suffered in death's sleep and punish the resurrected wrongdoers seems also pointless. The upshot is that justice, in making up for what has happened is not possible. The pain of the holocaust can't be ameliorated, but revenge can be taken. Hegel was right, history is a dialectic in which a minus is never neutralised by a plus – but another 'thing' (history) is synthesised. We learn from history we do not neutralize it, because we cannot.

It has been argued that the very arcane performances of near unintelligible texts in continental philosophy are produced to show the limits of metaphysics⁸¹ but still they fall victim to pointing to this limit. We also have another criteria for "epistemically uninterpretable utterances" below, but neither IMO has much use to thinking in their objectives, but do in their methodologies. In passing Donald Rumsfeld was famously castigated for his 'unknown unknowns' – but it makes sense and is easier to follow than Laruelle or the Silver Fox. I'll just address one more attempt at 'first philosophy' (AKA Metaphysics)

⁷⁹ Eternal damnation or bliss might be thought justice to a crime against an infinite being – AKA God – but to a finite being it isn't just- IMO!

⁸⁰ There is here a similar problem for those who seek to upload themselves into computers and so avoid biological death. Suppose this was possible, and a person could have their mind scanned and copied into a computer. Once done they could continue their biological life knowing their digital mind would continue after their biological death. What a comfort. But looking at the black box in which their mind no co-existed how would they know it did. By conversation? Their biological mind and biological body would be different, feel pain, age and die. Similar arguments for other worlds exist, a me in another world is of no comfort to me in this one.

⁸¹ Derrida and Laruelle I've read explained thus – but I've also read that they are clear and obvious..

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which historically always seems to really want to be 'A last philosophy'⁸² The list of philosophers who begin by arguing they have 'cracked' what all others failed is long, maybe there are exceptions. Ray Brassier's final solution in *Nihil Unbound* is death. The subject of philosophy is, or should be, death – extinction. The philosopher - as we all are – is already dead, as we will become extinct. A strange idea of retro-causality⁸³ - "extinction unfolds in an 'anterior posteriority' which usurps the 'future anteriority' of human existence.... But to acknowledge this truth, the subject of philosophy must also recognize that he or she is already dead, and that philosophy is neither a medium of affirmation nor a source of justification, but rather the organon of extinction."⁸⁴

In passing he also critiques the 'manifest image' given the neurological image – and suggests we should alter our language regarding consciousness in the light of neurological science. But why, we still call tables solid objects when we have known for ages they are mostly space, and the reason we don't fall through 'non solid' floors is the Pauli exclusion principle. Unlike Laruelle (who is an influence) and Derrida (who is not) Brassier's writing is clear in parts, if gloomy. Though why bother with philosophy given his being already dead definition? The clue is in his unpublished PhD. thesis "Alien Theory" –

"By acknowledging the fact that political intervention can no longer afford to ignore this insight; by recognising that empirical agency alone is incapable of circumventing capital's all-encompassing universality as World- Capitalism, transcendental scepticism constitutes an instance of a priori political resistance. By way of conclusion, we will characterise

⁸² "I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems" Wittgenstein – *Tractatus*.

⁸³ 'Retroactive' causality – (which Meillassoux's God doesn't have) is interesting. If the present is caused by the future then the future is caused by its future, if time is finite the last moment has no future so no cause – which destroys all presents, if time is infinite then no present will ever 'reach' a future infinite present. A finite present no matter how 'large' – how historical will always be infinitely removed from an infinite future present.

⁸⁴ *Nihil Unbound* pp 230, 239.

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this a priori form of cognitive and thereby political resistance in terms of three immediately pragmatic consequences:

1. The construction of rigorously meaningless, epistemically uninterpretable utterances, the better to unfold the Decisional circle whereby utterance's unobjectifiable material force is perpetually reinscribed within statement's objectivating horizons of significance.
2. The short-circuiting of the informational relay between material power and cognitive force.
3. Finally, the engendering of a mode of cognition that simultaneously constitutes an instance of universal noise as far the commodification of knowledge is concerned. This threefold emancipation of thought from artificially manufactured horizons of phenomenological meaning, as well as contingently synthesised codes of cognition, may prove to be a small, but by no means inconsequential step toward political liberation."

⁸⁵

So his aim is not a universalizing philosophy but a totalitarian politics. Someone else can claim this is shared in other 'Continental Philosophies' – Badiou, Deleuze... I do not, but in Brassier's case the motivation for his methodology is from his tutor Nick Land and "Accelerationism- In political and social theory, accelerationism is the idea that either the prevailing system of capitalism, or certain technosocial processes that have historically characterised it, should be expanded, repurposed or accelerated in order to generate radical social change."

This idea of "The construction of rigorously meaningless, epistemically uninterpretable utterances.." I happen not to think is true of the likes of Badiou, Deleuze, and certainly not the OOO philosophers, which might account for the outright hostility between Brassier and the OOO set. I think as technologies of thought, incapable of being Absolute or total, they can be very useful. They do not have to be completely true, in fact they cannot. Resisting the often used reference to Gödel, and his incompleteness theorem, of which I know but cannot follow, as I suspect many in the humanities who use this cannot actually 'do the math', I will

⁸⁵ Alien Theory p. 224.

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resort to the software analogy again. We all know from experience that software is never perfect! But can it be perfect? They answer is no. Or more properly – unlikely that it can be but more correctly we can never know if it is perfect or not. To start, it would like saying you can write a few thousand or million sentences without a single error. That's the first hurdle. But one which one first thinks is surmountable. O.K. Well we could check for errors⁸⁶. How? Another person – well they might not spot all your errors... they might even put in errors when attempting to correct ones they spot⁸⁷, well we could use a computer program to check! But (here is the catch) how do we know this checking program is itself perfect and does not have errors. "A question that frequently comes up is "Have you verified the verifier?" And this I can understand, hope you can, and relates to Gödel via Alan Turing and 'The Halting Problem'. You can think of writing a program that checks other programs for errors – but how do you construct such a program which itself you know has no errors? for if it had errors it wouldn't be a reliable checker – it's not possible to create such a program because of the 'The Halting Problem'. It's called 'The Halting Problem' as it's not possible to know for sure in advance if a program will halt or run forever. It's good to know if a program will halt when it should and also when it shouldn't - i.e. 'crash' or if it will run forever in an endless loop⁸⁸. And the point is any knowledge of this program – is it OK or not? is subject to the same question. Is the knowledge OK or not? We can never escape this hierarchy and find some absolute certain knowledge. Anyone who has used a computer will probably have experienced programs which crash, or 'hang' – are in some kind of infinite loop. It's not just poor software, though that plays a part, but even very simple programs will have this uncertainty about them. And **certainly** an error checking program would. Furthermore you cannot predict all the situations in which the software will be used, some new data enters that

⁸⁶ I now use any typos you find in this as proof! Brilliant get out of jail free for me here u think? I actually tried to type 'i think – but hit the wrong key – but I'll leave this mistake as more empirical evidence in addition to what you find yourself.

⁸⁷ I've worked in the software industry – and its very common occurrence.

⁸⁸ Attempts to write a 'checking program' fail as itself is not checked – but if it was then we have infinite regress.. An example of the problems caused by 'self reference'.

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was not expected and the program crashes. It is moved to another version of the O.S. and fails... you cannot predict the 'unknown unknowns'. However given now we can be sure of our uncertainty of the reliability of computer programs this does not make them useless. We use software, we find it extremely useful even despite 'The Halting Problem'. The program is finite, its possible contexts much larger possibly infinite. OOO in its removal of the object's essence from knowledge echoes or maybe mirrors- inverts this phenomena. A very good example of not only our current uncertainty regarding software but of future unknown or anticipated future contexts is that of the 'C' programming language. Much software in use now on PCs was originally written in C. A language created not for use in robust, virus prone environments. Its author didn't expect anyone else to use it and certainly not anyone else to exploit its lack of rigour in checking its inputs⁸⁹, which accounts for the vulnerability of much software. What of philosophy, well it also has similarities. From the kind of self reference – where do we stand to see everything... to over reliance on old technologies. Many philosophers still adhere to the law of the excluded middle, an Aristotelian move, one which was made way before Tarski's three-valued logic, or others,⁹⁰ notably Hegel! And so they stumble and fall prey to the problems of Universals and Sets of Sets... or for better these days riff with them⁹¹. One doesn't wait for technology to produce the perfect automobile, operating system or philosophy, "life is too fucking short"⁹², there will always be unknown unknowns! as we can never know- KNOW! Gregory Chaitin uses the example of the Jpeg

⁸⁹ A bit techie here but say in BASIC the program asks for a integer to be input – it will only allow integers, nothing else, but in C the input statement doesn't expect an evil Hacker to force in machine code and take over the computer rather than input the required integer! (This is the route in simple terms for the Hack) Obviously if the coder in C took the time to check and verify all input things would be less dodgy, but time and laziness.. deadlines to meet, the billions of lines of code already in use or simple naïvety...

⁹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-classical_logic

⁹¹ Riffing occurs with Cantor's set theory, Q.M. (and its cat) but not yet so much with non standard logics – "Tarski's axioms form a first-order theory devoid of set theory"!!!

⁹² Analyze This. 1999 directed by Harold Ramis.

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algorithm⁹³, not only can you not know it has no bugs, you can never know if some better compression algorithm might not come along in future. This he applies to scientific theories which is a problem for a science which wants to maintain its universal truth. This is also a problem for any philosophies which do likewise. However though many past philosophies sought absolute universal truth and are so vulnerable to this why should this be a necessity. A technology does not need to be perfect, thinking is a technology.

Philosophies need not be *purely* subjective and relative fictions or prescriptive universals, invalidating all others. They can be subjective – i.e. co-existing individuals - but have an object- objective. Philosophies can co-exist just as all real objects do, such as chairs and rocks. Even very old philosophies can function and have a value for thinking and not be mere obsolete historical antiques or disproven theories. So the difficulties some have with for instance Speculative Realism and OOO is not a problem. SR and OOO wish to engage with things, objects, in the world, this may require ignoring certain conditions of other philosophical systems, but neither is invalidated if they are seen as technological devices and not absolute systems of truth. Moreover even philosophical systems of Absolutes can still function – if that's what is interesting, provocative, thought provoking or cool⁹⁴. The metaphysical 'fit' of OOO might not be just 'taste' in the sense of D&G in WiP, but OOO seems to mesh with the post-modern environment, its architecture, issues, Weltanschauung....

One other idea derives from this possible co-existing and non contradicting multiplicities of thinking. We find in D&R individual objects as multiplicities rather than identities of a Genus. Individuality produced by original repetition in Deleuze is individual difference of

⁹³ The algorithm compresses pictures but the idea of Chaitin's goes for any software or philosophy! Or scientific theory!!!

⁹⁴ This is not anyway a 'new' idea, in 'Continental Philosophy' other philosophers are employed, sometimes modified, for example thought D&R and WiP. Notably in D&R p71 "The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism." Yet he employs Platonism to frame objects "Things are simulacra themselves" without an Ideal.... p. 81. (The Sophist) "shows the impossibility of distinguishing them from originals or from models"

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genuine repetition as opposed to the identity of the self-same. The self-same which creates the fiction of Universals. When we examine a rock we encounter an individual rock and not the 'category' of rocks, not a universal, we never actually encounter a universal in the great outdoors. The rock reveals its character to us, or some of its character, is shape, its texture, colour... Each encounter will be different depending on the actual rock. Rocks are individuals. Often in philosophy the discussion is about universals, rocks and snowflakes, fire and cotton... but we never experience a universal. Even an Object Oriented Ontology in dealing with the universal of 'Being' and not a specific ontic thing is dealing with a fiction. Maybe a useful fiction. Each rock, each thing, has its own life history of individual experiences, pace Heidegger – there is no *actual* 'Being' only beings. Fire doesn't always burn cotton and never in an identical way. An object may withdraw – but all objects in the same way- and always fully⁹⁵? Flat ontology is OK as long as it doesn't prescribe what specific being is to everything and anything. Every existence, every object must both be, and be different, otherwise it would cease to be an individual.

I think the 'ceasing to be an individual' is a worry of Harman's, which results in his declaring objects to be infinitely withdrawn to ward off their merging with everything else. But a particular 'rock' is not "A Rock" – a universal word for individual stuff which can be classified with a noun, a proper name would be better but even that not ensure individuality. What would do to uniquely name our rock could be its email address, or a URL - Uniform Resource Identifier (URI); (An Internet Protocol address (IP address) or a MAC address (A media access control address (MAC address), also called physical address, is a unique identifier assigned to network interfaces for communications on the physical network segment.) Technology can solve the problem of maintaining individuality. What actually stops individuals from

⁹⁵ In physics, the Bekenstein bound is an upper limit on the entropy S , or information I , that can be contained within a given finite region of space which has a finite amount of energy—or conversely, the maximum amount of information required to perfectly describe a given physical system down to the quantum level. It implies that the information of a physical system, or the information necessary to perfectly describe that system, must be finite if the region of space and the energy is finite. Compare this with the citation from Tim Morton's *Realist Magic* above.

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dissolving into everything else is not IMO that interesting, A is not B, it's different! The problem of "everything" like that of "nothing" are that these meta-physical problems are conceptual / linguistic / logical ones. Though the idea or fiction of categories might be useful it creates this problem, like the idea of 'nothing'. They are meta-physical. At the level of the physical, taste is important, even to the extent that each person reacts not only differently to stimuli like art, but also food, disease and drugs... Each rock will have it own charms, each incineration of cotton will be a unique event.

Philosophy might want to chase these universal fictions into some absolute, and the chase might be interesting, it might have to advertise itself as being the next big thing, the final solution, or be as Brassier said (at least in his PhD thesis) an attempt to sabotage Capitalism, but maybe such claims will, when seen to be hype, do more damage than good. This desire for completion, is a desire to rid the world of desire. There is a guilt about insatiable desire, which it's argued by some as being bad and on which capitalism feeds. We are back with the fetishism of consumerism. One trope is to embrace it as a form of Accelerationism. However I think the important pairing here is 'insatiable desire' which could well be Deleuze's bad person of ill will at work, or the desiring machine, individual life itself is desire, "Deleuze and Guattari argue that desire is a positive process of production that produces reality" ... and any fulfilment of this desire, an absolute, rather than the insatiable, will end the game. Any conclusion – *ibid!* Insatiability is the essence of OOOs objects... Including itself... 'Insatiable desire' which is generally considered an evil, responsible for capitalism, globalization, global warming, pollution and diminution of species and resources. Capitalism has to now employ the various tropes of advertising not to reveal these insatiable desires but conceal and / or justify them. Yet if Deleuze and Guattari are right and these are the very organon of the production of reality they are not an excess or dangerous supplement but the very act of genesis. Rather than accelerate Capitalism's demise a brazen consumerism of insatiable desire already destroys capitalism as it – capitalism can never satiate the insatiable, or would this be desirable - satiation is sad⁹⁶! You could consider this act the Master Slave reversal

⁹⁶ satiate (v.)

mid-15c., from Latin *satiatus*, past participle of *satiare* "fill full, satisfy," from *satis* "enough," from PIE root **sa-* "to satisfy" (source also of Gothic *saps* "satiated," Old English *sæd* "satisfied;" see *sad*). Related: *Satiated*; *satiating*.

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of Hegel or the reversal of Brassier's idea that we are already dead, by knowing our desires are insatiable and yet to continue to desire is to produce reality. Art and philosophy would now not describe reality as science does in general terms but to individualize non-identifiable (and always so) desires which is a creative process.

Art doesn't suffer because the latest painting is the greatest, or rather it did! Reinhardt's Ultimate paintings caused a catastrophe in fine art painting still unresolved. Too many death announcements have not been good for art or the humanities in general. Too much hype and the use of science and maths theory which loses the individual. And OK – lets avoid Anthropocentrism, logocentrism phallogocentrism and Phallogocentrism in favour of multiplicity and individuality. I'm not arguing for science being a good or bad thing – or technology, I'm not sure if I have a single point to make, or that it would be good to make one. **(If)** Art /philosophy isn't a science but is a technology, Techné which Heidegger relates to Poiesis then we needn't demand exclusive universalism in these endeavours or criticise their lack. In all my reading of Derrida, its difficulty and at times IMO slights of hands twists and turns rather than a logical movement, one acceptable to dead philosophy, I detect a play, a "Différance - a French term coined by Jacques Derrida. It is a central concept in Derrida's deconstruction, a critical outlook concerned with the relationship between text and meaning. The term *différance* literally means "difference and deferral of meaning." To which rather than just language texts we might apply to humans, and all objects individually not universally – see I've contradicted myself! (**all** objects)As Jacques seems to by falling victim to self reference – hence maybe the elaborate texts - anyway the quote I wanted is –

sad (adj.)

Old English *sæd* "sated, full, having had one's fill (of food, drink, fighting, etc.), weary of," from Proto-Germanic **sathaz* (source also of Old Norse *saðr*, Middle Dutch *sat*, Dutch *zad*, Old High German *sat*, German *satt*, Gothic *saþs* "satiated, sated, full"), from PIE **seto-* (source also of Latin *satis* "enough, sufficient," Greek *hadros* "thick, bulky," Old Church Slavonic *sytu*, Lithuanian *sotus* "satiated," Old Irish *saith* "satiety," *sathach* "sated"), from root **sa-* "to satisfy" (source also of Sanskrit *a-sinvan* "insatiable").

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“to speak of deconstruction, and to lead elsewhere to its being written and transcribed, in a word which will also be more beautiful. When I speak of this writing of the other which will be more beautiful, I clearly understand translation as involving the same risk and chance as the poem. How to translate "poem"? a "poem"?...”

Identity is the province of science and mathematics, individuality the province of the arts. Well it is in Deleuze but not in modern art, in Deleuze Art like Philosophy synthesises stuff, in modern art it analyses stuff – it analyses itself⁹⁷. The crisis in the arts and in philosophy was one of identity. What is art? What is philosophy? But identity, as outlined by Deleuze in D&R fails to generate or genuinely repeat. The very crisis was the search for identity as opposed to the individualization of difference as repetition. As reality. Failure to make (this new) reality (in art) creates an identity crisis. This runs deeper into the very fact of being, and the search to identify, a crisis in philosophy- pace Heidegger (again) to identify ‘being’ is to destroy it. (So I’ll throw in another contentions remark) LGBT is a four fold sexuality, it identifies sexuality. It makes the same mistake IMO (now as I write this) as Aristotle in trying to define – identify things. He comes out with the argument that a builder is a builder even when asleep. Derrida I think somewhere posits an infinity of genders, even in time? A professional philosopher recently delivered a professorial lecture entitled “Ecce homo sexual”⁹⁸. I see outrage directed at me by a group for challenging that assertion. There are no LGBTs, such acronyms are good for sandwiches, but even then every BLT is different. This is not just a flippant or provocative statement. There is a real crisis of identity, for people, in art and in philosophy. And as OOO might see it in the attempts to identify anything. The idea of identity which at first seems to bring with it truth, good sense, common sense and a solution (satiation) is taken up by the individual. Individuals recognise groups. (The third postulate of The Image of Thought is recognition.) They both seek to be in a group, thus gaining identity and then to recognise other groups. This double fiction disguised as good will creates a crisis.

⁹⁷ You can spot this even in Deleuze – What *is* Philosophy? It might be the creation of concepts – but what then is the definition What *is* Philosophy?

⁹⁸ Golding, Johnny (2014). "Ecce Homo Sexual: Ontology and Eros in the Age of Incompleteness and Entanglement". Parallax

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Identity can always be questioned. It offers certainty and so produces uncertainty and the fear of loss. To loose ones identity is not good, in certain circumstances it means deportation, ostracization and worse. Hence the dilemma, in order to be an individual, an authentic individual, individuals becoming aware of their individuality seek identity and so in attempting to or actually achieving this no longer become individuals. The satiation of a desire is sad. Again I would anticipate much criticism in this, 'what are the oppressed then to do?- conform? Be subjugated?'. I don't know, I haven't the answer, do we want a final answer - well death is a final solution, otherwise try anything and everything- deceit, bad faith, violence, lies, truth, invention.. Rather than be aggressive towards a group from a group an alternative is to hide. This is obviously not thought good, everything should be in the open. Well that's OK if you are a Lion on the savannah. If you form a herd make sure you are big enough and happy with that. Seems that group action is thought generally good, self interest, insatiable desire bad. Why do we despise creatures which live under rocks and admire predators? There seems in this some unconscious ethic at work – that deception is wrong. Camouflage a sin? Or a sign of weakness? Now I'm not saying an individual should feel bad about themselves, hide in shame for whatever reason. But hiding isn't always shameful in nature, the recluse or Hermit maybe a sad individual, but also might be holy other? We seem to have a set of judgements which demand openness, truth, and respect even nobility... we despise the snake. Are we being forced into these standpoints by some ideology which is not good in the first place. The oppressed seeks not liberty but to be an oppressor. Nothing is changed in the hegemony, the play remains the same text – only the actors change. This is mankind's grand narrative. It's biblical. The creature which offers freedom is turned into a snake -low life.

The 'difficulties' raised in treating classes, groups as individuals, the problems of identification preventing individualization and effective creativity, effective repetition is, as above, an extremely contentious idea. A very bad idea. Ecology is a universal for the multiple differences of objects, some living others not.

I don't have a solution, just more problems and the impossible activity of insatiable desire which is creative, is the creative power in Art and Philosophy. They are fetish objects.

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The alternative seems to be the common sense of the group, one which is responsible for confrontation, wars, violence and death on a much larger scale than the individual, but then that too is a result of technology. Rather than resort to the already given means – the protest group, the rally, meetings... what D&R does is label these as part of The Image of Thought, see postulates 6,7,8. The alternative can't be given, for ***it is for the individual to genuinely create..***

We now see increasingly a technology which breaks up the groups, individualizes the individual via the internet and smart phones and this process is continually under negative criticism from the prevailing institutions of the previous centuries' mass markets, mass audiences, mass wars. For example Ray Brassier-

"The 'speculative realist movement' exists only in the imaginations of a group of bloggers promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever: actor-network theory spiced with pan-psychist metaphysics and morsels of process philosophy. I don't believe the internet is an appropriate medium for serious philosophical debate; nor do I believe it is acceptable to try to concoct a philosophical movement online by using blogs to exploit the misguided enthusiasm of impressionable graduate students. I agree with Deleuze's remark that ultimately the most basic task of philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I see little philosophical merit in a 'movement' whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated an online orgy of stupidity."⁹⁹

I've tried to look up Deleuze's remark – but have failed to find it, anyway Ray is making an appeal to authority and not referencing a citation! Deleuze however does discuss stupidity in D&R-

"Stupidity (not error) constitutes the greatest weakness of thought, but also the source of its highest power in that which forces it to think"¹⁰⁰

Not error, it is stupidity which opposes dogmatic thought and is the *techne* of thinking. And the phrase 'online orgy of stupidity' as I see it would be something to which Deleuze would welcome as a productive

⁹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_realism.

¹⁰⁰ D&R p. 345

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shattering of academic tradition and dogma. The internet is nomadic and ever deterritorializing itself..

“Not an individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought, but an individual full of ill will who does not manage to think, either naturally or conceptually. Only such an individual is without presuppositions. Only such an individual effectively begins and effectively repeats.”¹⁰¹

Once the individual is identified by the ‘good and common categories of sense’ they lose their individuality. It was the problem of identification which in philosophy created the idea of the ideal. The perfect rock, the form or essence of rock, rockness. Any philosopher proposing such a universal, an absolute identity seems to me a little omniscient. And so we fall into the problem of our definitions being at odds with other definitions. We say stuff like – ‘That thing can’t be art because it fails to meet this general criteria we have established’... - The world one philosopher says, its objects, are ALL like this, another disagrees. But surely different individuals and different experiences of them demand of the philosopher or artist an individual response, it’s the insurance companies and scientists that generalise about universals – ‘useful fictions’.

The prevailing model or paradigm in the arts in modernity was science and to a lesser extent mathematics. This was also true of philosophy, especially the Anglo American tradition in which it still is, the likes of Michael Dummett still regard logic as a binary system of true and false, laws established by Aristotle are still arbiters of truth despite the different logics from Hegel onwards. It was Hegel who saw philosophy as a science. His key work, *The Science of Logic* which is his ‘first philosophy’ has until recently been ignored in favour of his theories of history, but these are just examples of applying the universal science of the dialectic outlined in *The Science of Logic*. Within ‘Continental Philosophy’ there has been an uncomfortable tension with science, notably in Heidegger but also Nietzsche and Kierkegaard and throughout existentialism. Which is one of the reasons why Anglo American Philosophy was so critical of ‘Continental Philosophy’. The correct method in 20thC Anglo American Philosophy was in cases “To

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 166 (The butterfly edition throughout)

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say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science" (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein...et. al.) all else being nonsense. The recent move in Speculative Realism still has about it a confusion regarding logic over rhetoric, practicality over universality, synthetic creation over analytic description.... The more creative responses to and in SR are seeing that philosophy is more like art than science, and this of course lies in the Continental tradition from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre through to Derrida and Deleuze. A philosophy which attempts the universal and fundamental theories of everything cannot compete with science. Stuff like CERN and the Hubble telescope, Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) or The International Space Station (ISS) (which is the most expensive object ever built), teams working together collaboration on hypothesis creation and funded by billions. Disciplines in which complexity has reached phenomenal detail, branches of mathematics such as Hilbert Spaces, Manifolds with tensor fields, Lie Algebras, Surreal numbers, Surcomplex number, Hahn series, Hyperreal numbers... Mathematics like science has become so large in its scope any detailed knowledge of its entirety is not possible. Is this true of the arts? I don't think so, within art the public engage with the art activity, they do not need popular science books which translate the scientific calculations which use such things as Hyperreal numbers into caricatures non specialists can understand. And from 'popular science' comes the danger that once one has read a book on popular science one can think that one understands the actual science. The equivalent is thinking that once a child has understood red riding hood they know explicitly what paedophilia is. Despite Lacan¹⁰² and many others, using science as metaphor is all philosophy and the arts can do with science and mathematics, they should no more put forward corrections to science than be able to locate non terrestrial life somewhere in the universe or create fusion power. It might seem cute to base ontology on

¹⁰² Lacan Famously denied his use of a Möbius strip was a metaphor for the mind...

- what he said was that it "can be considered the basis of a sort of essential inscription at the origin, the knot which constitutes the subject..... (The torus (a mathematical doughnut object... is not an analogy.... This torus really exists and it is exactly the structure of the neurotic. It is not an analogon; it is not even an abstraction....."

(Lacan 1970, pp. 195-196 here from Fashionable Nonsense Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont.)

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set theory – but set theory itself is far from something of a basis¹⁰³. And there are dangers here – as we have seen in the case of Morton who has followed Hegel in making claims about the world premised on a philosophy, which despite protestations, is Idealism, i.e. made up in the mind. Hegel denying the possibility of ‘new’ planets, Morton the Higgs boson. Brassier’s nihilism is built on a scientific theory of heat death, though recent work by Penrose and Max Tegmark are part of a general move in mathematics and cosmology towards multiverses, and even the

¹⁰³ This is Rudy Rucker writing in 2004 in a preface to the 2005 edition of *Infinity and the Mind*, in which a detailed exposition of Gödel’s TWO incompleteness theorems can be found – 28 pages and also some fairly accessible set theory... regarding the work of W.H. Woodin “He and colleagues feel set theory is a crossroads relating to a principle that he calls the Omega Conjecture, and which I can barely understand. This is twenty-first century mathematics, well beyond the grasp of my twentieth-century PhD in set theory” !!!

Here is a game I play using Wikipedia, to see how deep the rabbit hole goes, I know what a set is, and have actually used them in constructing relational databases – but I fail to grasp any of what follows – and in case you don’t bother to read it all - my point is that when Badiou or Morton cite set theory it can only be metaphorical and a bad metaphor at that –I cite the following to argue within the arts there are equally baffling structures - the question is why baffling? Maybe that reality isn’t amenable fully to any understanding – which I’d argue is where art and a philosophy such as OOO can make a significance. I’m not arguing against Badiou or Morton – just against the pretence that art and philosophical ideas are like those of science and mathematics. Some want them to be – but the 9th Symphony isn’t an equation, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is a work of fiction, as is Finnegans Wake or *À la recherche du temps perdu*, and these can expose realities to us... pace Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*.

From Wikipedia then -> go!

(W.H. Woodin) has done work on the theory of generic multiverses and related concept of Ω -logic which suggested an argument that the continuum hypothesis is either undecidable or false in the sense of mathematical platonism. Woodin criticizes this view arguing that it leads to a counterintuitive reduction in which all truths in the set theoretical universe can be decided from a small part of it. He claims that these and related mathematical results lead (intuitively) to the conclusion that Continuum Hypothesis has a truth value and the Platonistic approach is reasonable.

Woodin now predicts that there should be a way of constructing an inner model for almost all known large cardinals which he calls the Ultimate L and which would have similar properties as Gödel’s constructible universe. In particular, the

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heat death is surmounted by Q.M.¹⁰⁴ The move from the scientific model in art and philosophy might be difficult, 'experimental music' sounds cool. But there never was an hypothesis of 'music' or 'art' and analysis of what art or philosophy is results in nothing, because art and philosophy are or IMO should be constructive synthetic operations. And whilst some might wish for the obscurity of advanced mathematics and physics – envy the cult of Hawking and the numerous T.V. documentaries on cutting edge science and not current philosophy. Philosophy / Artists need an audience other than other philosophers /

Continuum Hypothesis would be true in this universe....

In mathematics, in set theory, the constructible universe (or Gödel's constructible universe), denoted L , is a particular class of sets that can be described entirely in terms of simpler sets. It was introduced by Kurt Gödel in his 1938 paper "The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum-Hypothesis".[1] In this, he proved that the constructible universe is an inner model of ZF set theory, and also that the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis are true in the constructible universe. This shows that both propositions are consistent with the basic axioms of set theory, if ZF itself is consistent. Since many other theorems only hold in systems in which one or both of the propositions is true, their consistency is an important result.....

L can be thought of as being built in "stages" resembling the von Neumann universe, V ...

In set theory and related branches of mathematics, the von Neumann universe, or von Neumann hierarchy of sets, denoted V , is the class of hereditary well-founded sets. This collection, which is formalized by Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC), is often used to provide an interpretation or motivation of the axioms of ZFC....

V is not "the set of all sets" for two reasons. First, it is not a set; although each individual stage V_α is a set, their union V is a proper class. Second, the sets in V are only the well-founded sets. The axiom of foundation (or regularity) demands that every set is well founded and hence in V , and thus in ZFC every set is in V . But other axiom systems may omit the axiom of foundation or replace it by a strong negation (an example is Aczel's anti-foundation axiom). These non-well-founded set theories are not commonly employed, but are still possible to study.

In the foundations of mathematics, Aczel's anti-foundation axiom is an axiom set forth by Peter Aczel (1988), as an alternative to the axiom of foundation in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. It states that every accessible pointed directed

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Artists as they can provide the technologies for this audience to think (new) things for themselves. 'Aczel's anti-foundation axiom' ... Quine Atoms ... might sound cool but are useless for every day life in most cases. Philosophers, and Artists might envy the mystique of Modern Science but that is all they can do, they can not achieve the depths of analysis of these disciplines. They can however unleash creative individual imaginations accessible to a receptive audience without the need for an idiots guide or TV documentary. They can produce useful

graph corresponds to a unique set. In particular, according to this axiom, the graph consisting of a single vertex with a loop corresponds to a set that contains only itself as element, i.e. a Quine atom. A set theory obeying this axiom is necessarily a non-well-founded set theory.

An alternative approach to urelements is to consider them, instead of as a type of object other than sets, as a particular type of set. Quine atoms are sets that only contain themselves, that is, sets that satisfy the formula $x = \{x\}$. [5]

Quine atoms cannot exist in systems of set theory that include the axiom of regularity, but they can exist in non-well-founded set theory. ZF set theory with the axiom of regularity removed is compatible with the existence of Quine atoms, although it does not prove that any non-well-founded sets exist. Aczel's anti-foundation axiom implies there is a unique Quine atom. Other non-well-founded theories may admit many distinct Quine atoms; at the opposite end of the spectrum lies Boffa's axiom of superuniversality, which implies that the distinct Quine atoms form a proper class.

¹⁰⁴ There is one last line of speculation that must not be forgotten. In science we are used to neglecting things that have a very low probability of occurring even though they are possible in principle. For example, it is permitted by the laws of physics that my desk rise up and float in the air. All that is required is that all the molecules 'happen' to move upwards at the same moment in the course of their random movements. This is so unlikely to occur, even over the fifteen-billion-year history of the Universe, that we can forget about it for all practical purposes. However, when we have an infinite future to worry about all this, fantastically improbable physical occurrences will eventually have a significant chance of occurring. An energy field sitting at the bottom of its vacuum landscape will eventually take the fantastically unlikely step of jumping right back up to the top of the hill. An inflationary universe could begin all over again for us. Yet more improbably, our entire Universe will have some minutely small probability of undergoing a quantum-transition into another type of universe. Any inhabitants of universes undergoing such radical reform will not survive. Indeed, the probability of something dramatic of a quantum-transforming nature occurring

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stuff! The Iphone or Internet isn't less cool than physics because more or less anyone can use these technologies.

Art (and philosophy it seems) does not repudiate its history. Art Galleries are not Museums in which old extinct ideas are subjects of curiosity, literature is not a scientific analysis of the world. Philosophy perhaps is caught between the two ideas, of a scientific redundancy and disapproval of theories, and the Artistic validity of any significant creativity.

"A man climbs a mountain because it's there.

A man makes a work of art because it isn't there." - Carl Andre.

Physics, once called natural philosophy broke from philosophy around the time of Kant. He seems the first philosopher who was not also a scientist. Though he set out to produce propositions which were not subject to any uncertainty as are those of science. Perhaps Greek Mathematics, geometry and logic seemed to offer an example of unquestionable truths and any philosophy which could do likewise might claim a kind of superiority over the emerging natural philosophy which is now called physics.

The origin of this might relate to the ancient Greek philosophy where the speculative thought was regarded as a valid method for objective reasoning about reality. During the Medieval Ages Theology became to be considered 'The Queen' of the sciences with its twin Sophia. As the Absolute reality of God was then a given it should be obvious that the study of Theology would be knowledge of the highest and most real, and to this the medieval scholars added logic and Greek philosophy, notably that of Aristotle in which Absolute Truth could be located. The purview of Metaphysics – in Scholasticism established a dogmatic metaphysics, a

to a system gets smaller as the system gets bigger.

It is much more likely that objects within the Universe, like rocks, black holes or people, will undergo such a remake before it happens to the Universe as a whole. This possibility is important, not so much because we can say what might happen when there is an infinite time in which it can happen, but because we can't. When there is an infinite time to wait then anything that can happen, eventually will happen. Worse (or better) than that, it will happen infinitely often.

J. D. Barrow *The Book of Nothing* p.317

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knowledge above all others. With the enlightenment and Kant this Dogmatic Transcendent knowledge was not so much abandoned as replaced by a transcendental metaphysics which itself set the limits to thinking and knowledge and claimed such limits as absolute without the requirement of an Absolute Being. It attempted to provide a ground for the empirical sciences, one that was not particularly called for then by those practising 'Natural Philosophy' AKA Physics, and certainly not now. Even so remnants of this idea of first philosophy – metaphysics, providing an overarching framework for human activity, politics, art and science still seems to have lingered in philosophy only to re-emerge more fully in Speculative Realism.

Since the enlightenment philosophy has lost not only physics but psychology linguistics and logic as separate disciplines no longer subject to any philosophical transcendental limit or justification. Whilst the Anglo American schools were delimiting just what was 'sense' in doing so they removed metaphysics and much else from philosophy the Continental tradition focused more on particular human existential 'being', a focus much more allied to the Arts and politics. The move in Speculative Realism is therefore in difficulty if it both wants to maintain a synthetic creative programme yet take seriously and engage seriously with analytical science and mathematics. When Meillassoux wants to claim back for philosophy the great outdoors his tools are those of logic, non contradiction and mathematics, set theory and probability. I think his idea of mathematics as a route is not a good one as explained above, see also footnote 98! If philosophers want access to the great outdoors, if they want to 'think' the world without thought, this is IMO not possible by analytical methods. It requires a non-scientific 'thinking' – which doesn't mean a correlational concern or logic/linguistics but individual imaginations which can explore the great outdoors in many different ways. Harman alludes to the interactions not just between humans and things, but to interactions between rocks and snowflakes, politics and a flea.... different interactions. These seemingly are withdrawn from analysis but not from synthesis.¹⁰⁵

We maybe need to learn from each object something about what it is. We have chance encounters never with a universal table but always

¹⁰⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ghost_of_a_Flea

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with a specific table. Eddington has two tables, Harman has three¹⁰⁶, I've lost count of how many tables I've encountered and I've come across table like things – or used things as tables - things which I'm really uncertain about. And the same goes for philosophies as it does for tables- we have encounters with them but why should one nullify another.

Even Bad Music fails in its instantiation to be a universal no matter how generic it is!

¹⁰⁶ *Graham Harman's book THE THIRD TABLE (Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2012).*

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"the matter of philosophy is subjectivity" – Martin Heidegger.

Though flat ontology, the democracy of objects and generic philosophy seem OK, as OK as Plato's forms – but not on any higher transcendental level – there might be problems and objections as well as a **subjective**¹⁰⁷ difference. If in OOO et al categories are equal to individuals, and these categories maybe well founded or they may not... racial and religious categories can deteriorate? into racial and religious slurs. Races and groups can be identified and form the focus for aggression and prejudice, or advantage. Categories can be fictitious, spurious, sub-conscious or even non-existent and contradictory yet in the world of flat ontology they are all ontologically equivalent. If a witch is as real qua being as cotton there is perhaps no 'good reason' for not burning one more than the other. A theory of flat ontology in a theory of flat ontology is ontologically equivalent to all other ontological theories.

For the 'subject' (Me!) conceptual forms, philosophical forms no different, are not objects but processes of analysis, identification and/or creative synthesis. A philosophical form unlike an object is never immediate to me in anyway- the response to a text is reading, not the immediate sensuality of the typeface or the cover of the book, though these are objects with sensual qualities. The page of unread text is not the conceptual form, even ideologies are not immediate but need to be thought through. They are 'technologies' which reveal themselves in use. Just as the rock is a rock qua rock, its 'technology' is when it is used as a tool. Theories are like objects but they (attempt to?) maintain a specific content despite any hidden and withdrawn contents in order to be theories of something particular, in order to be useful.

If they have hidden contents, as OOO maintains, if in the last instance no final reading is achievable the programme of OOO itself is liable to be un-reliable – must be un-reliable as the real 'reality' of the theory if it is an object in OOO is forever withdrawn and hidden. If the 'real reality' plays no significant part in the understanding of the theory it is therefore not (part of) the theory.... That the theory withdraws is true,

¹⁰⁷ Subjective rather than 'fundamental' – fundamental implies some absolute...

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that its essence is absolutely withdrawn is not. Once again we need care in relation to 'absolute' knowledge.

"Writing is read, and "in the last analysis" does not give rise to a hermeneutic deciphering, to the decoding of a meaning or truth."¹⁰⁸

We have seen there can't be any 'last analysis', so the idea of an unknown 'essence' which is definite is (only) an *idea*. Why this unknown essence invalidates our reading seems to me to remove the actual synthetic force of OOO. (In Harman the object remains aloof – for fear of blending into everything else- and we 'know' of it by vicars which transmit sensations from it to us.) It seems to me that the wonderful promise of OOO is access to objects, but then for some logical reason is removed from our grasp in the last instance. But is this necessary? For instance the full consequences of General Relativity were not immediately known to Einstein, and may never be fully known. But it was still useful, informative in the first instance ... and second, third etc. If there is a never-to-be-known essence and whatever this is plays no part in our access one might then simply use Occam's razor and ignore this forever hidden essence. The two 'absolutes' here are first that there is an absolute thing but we can never know anything of its reality, and the other that there is an absolute free play of interpretation, what it is is what it is for us. But as we have seen as a theory OOO (or any theory) is no different to a set of statements and these will be no different in their reliability to computer software which is itself sets of statements. OOO not only has the particular problem of its idea of the withdrawn essence of objects but like all sets of statements, unless nonsense, the prevention of 'philosophical certainty' caused by the 'The Halting Problem'. Harman et al are stymied not only if they remove the object absolutely from us but if they want 'absolutes' also by 'The Halting Problem'. A theory which withdraws from everything including itself fails to reveal what it is, what is revealed is what it is not. To try to be clear 'The Halting Problem' gives us a degree of uncertainty, not total certainty, or absolute uncertainty – such as the absolute contingency of Meillassoux. Computer programs tend to work most of the time. That is why they are useful, that is the reality of technology.

¹⁰⁸ Signature, Event, Context -Jacques Derrida. A communication to the Congrès international des Sociétés de philosophie de langue française, Montreal, August 1971. From *Margins of Philosophy*, tr. Alan Bass, pp. 307-330

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Attempts at objectivity whilst seemingly aiming at a firmer ground than subjectivity in doing so ignore deliberately or not these unreliabilities of self reference and incompleteness¹⁰⁹. To me this seems quite naïve unless deliberate. Within science a degree of uncertainty is a given – though at times this is not made clear, is not plain – any theory in science should be subject to empirical refutation. Only one black swan is required to refute 'all swans are white'. Within science empirical observation is mathematized as soon as possible so that observational error is eliminated from the proceedings. All that is required then is mathematical integrity which is maybe considered more sure or absolute¹¹⁰. Nevertheless it is possible to question the a priori nature of these logics or the possibility that they might not be nothing more than fictions themselves- though very useful fictions. Mathematics has useful fictions- imaginary numbers – n dimensional geometries right through to the idea of equality and identity. Of course Speculative Realism and all philosophy might also be useful fictions, but as above at times they seem not to present themselves as such. Well maybe Harman as well as Deleuze do say something to the effect.

Speculative Realism may or may not be subject empirical refutation- as theory it is subject to both its own claims and those of The Halting Problem. A 'Subjective Realism' would not. Subjective Realism would be how we use the technology- in this case of thinking- for ourselves. The reading of a philosophical text (in Sub-Rel) is the subjective application of a tool. It is subjective because I read it, it is real because I really read it, and it is real. This is no different to driving a car. Neither is my driving absolute, or completely arbitrary and contingent- if the latter I'd not last long. Or is the car anything I choose it to be - the car is neither perfect – absolute, or is it **totally** contingent and random, like all technology some parts might not even work properly or at all but the technology can still function.

Another proviso we touched on above are ethical considerations – should a science be free of ethics, both in its practice, animal / human experimentation, and in its possible outcomes, planetary annihilation

¹⁰⁹ 'Incompleteness' is another expression of 'The Halting Problem'... and associated ideas from Kurt Gödel to the Busy Beaver.... no joke!

¹¹⁰ Both Meillassoux and Badiou seem to ground their philosophies in Mathematical Absolutes!

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for instance. Is 000 also in its reducing burning people ontologically to burning cotton being unethical and is this important¹¹¹?

The considerations above not only apply to 000, or Speculative Realism.....

Ray Brassier sees neuroscience as descriptive of 'real' mental processes rather than the 'The Manifest Image'¹¹² – which is a 'fiction'. But fictions can have real effects, pornography for example has affects which are not revealed by any detailed description of the medium in which it appears, the nature of paper, film, video tape, computer's state or mechanisms. A book's 'manifest image' is its narrative – which might be a fiction, the meaning of the text is not as materially 'real' as the paper, ink and binding, but this materiality misses what a book *is*. The 'force' of the book is in its text! fiction or not. In Computer technology the activity of the CPU can be well known and understood, at one level it is processing binary strings, at another it can be displaying a movie. No matter how technical ones knowledge of the CPU the movie will not reveal itself to that technical knowledge. Its revelation requires a cultural context outside of the electronics. Sure an analysis will show that the CPU is active in image processing, those components which process images will 'light up' hot when doing so, and here is the analogy with brain scans which do much the same, for instance when humans read or speak, and so provide insight and knowledge to the biological mechanisms behind

¹¹¹ In the arts especially architecture there is currently interest in 000. An ethical consideration is that historically ideas in architecture have not always proved socially good. Ideas such as high rise 'machines for living in' were social disasters.

¹¹² In his "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" (1962), Sellars distinguishes between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of the world. The manifest image includes intentions, thoughts, and appearances. Sellars allows that the manifest image may be refined through 'correlational induction', but he rules out appeal to imperceptible entities. The scientific image describes the world in terms of the theoretical physical sciences. It includes notions such as causality and theories about particles and forces. The two images sometimes complement one another, and sometimes conflict. For example, the manifest image includes practical or moral claims, whereas the scientific image does not. There is conflict, e.g. where science tells us that apparently solid objects are mostly empty space. Sellars favours a synoptic vision, wherein the scientific image takes ultimate precedence in cases of conflict, at least with respect to empirical descriptions and explanations. - wiki.

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thought. But the processing mechanisms are not the same as the data being processed. Brassier and all critics of the Manifest Image I think make this fundamental mistake. At a very basic level in computer science a bit string has no meaning without context. 10000101001 could be an instruction, part of an image or a sound... tracing its path through processing units might determine that it is a sound but even then this would not determine what the sound was if it had a meaning. The sound might be spoken English, but no analysis of the processing mechanisms would reveal this meaning unless the listener already knew English and ***listened*** to the sound and not traced the processing in the electronics. And we could imagine this bit string was part of a complex mathematical text- analysis of the device storing this text would not provide its meaning, or a method for our understanding of it. Examining a knowledge system is no different to reading a book, being able to read does not guarantee or provide meaning from the text itself, and certainly knowing how a book 'works' would not grant specific understanding of a specific text. The neurological hardware for activities can be traced and maybe understood in detail, but that is not the whole story, just as a detailed understanding of a cine projector and the transport of film projecting images will not elucidate the movie's narrative. It seems to me incredibly naïve to think knowledge of the synaptic functions will reveal their subject. As if by looking at the contents of the CPU's registers we could say that it's processing a movie in Russian based on a Shakespeare play... and such a technological understanding would reveal the meaning of the Russian despite our not knowing the language. Neurological biology may one day have a detailed understanding of how the brain works but not what it does, or what it can do, unless they can know the 'manifest image'. Neurologists may one day know the biological mechanisms used in writing a poem or those used in solving a complex equation. But these will not reveal how and why these 'objects' come about, the actual intelligence, desires, memories... which form the states of mind which are responsible for the poem or mathematical equation. If human minds were just hardware functions it follows from a technological understanding we could build an Einstein... or a Picasso, or a 'you'. Any such ideas (of this possibility) are materially naïve on this level. The mind – manifest image – might be a non material construct – I don't think it is something flaky – but it has 'ideas', 'concepts' which are like statements in a computer language which perform tasks on hardware or using hardware. Knowing how this hardware works will not reveal what this hardware can do when

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running a program. Or what the program can do. No matter how much we know about the hardware there will be programs of which such knowledge is no help in understanding the program. This is a word processor, this computer's material technology does not limit the complexity of the texts that it's possible to place in it or write by using it. A CPU can run software that is far more complex than the hardware. We don't know yet but I bet it's not just that smart people have better neurological equipment, I think it might be that they have better, or if you like more complex, minds running on the hardware. It's fairly obvious that there is more than a mechanism, minds need nurture, training, the teaching of facts and methods and of an entire culture. And smart minds we should remember thought up 'The Halting Problem', any neurological theory will be subject to it as will any 'mind'. At the most mechanical level the mind, any persons mind, is not predictable. One that was could solve the 'The Halting Problem'.

This leaves the 'Manifest Image' looking like a application running on some hardware, and surely no one thinks applications on computers are somehow inferior to this hardware. The hardware ***supports*** the software.. The fiction of virtual machines is not poorer for being less 'real', virtual machines are common in computer software. OOP – by which I mean Object Oriented ***Programming*** uses conceptual objects and properties such as inheritance which do not occur at the level of CPU operations. High level languages use icons, 'folders' and documents and process these as text data or numeric data, sound and vision and these are 'objects' which do not exist in low level language instruction code which is the only actual program code which runs on the actual hardware. The functionality of computers, their ability as tools, to simulate reality, perform complex tasks and play games is that these 'higher' functions can be implemented by lower level operations. To think that these lower level operations are more 'real' is a mistake, the actuality is that these lower level functions are not 'aware' of the higher level activities, moreover these higher level activities can be implemented on different physical devices.

We now know when we feel pain this is a function of the brain, pain relief stops the signals getting through which trigger the pain, however even a technical biological diagnosis would ask a simple question as to where ***in the body*** was the pain. The manifest image's image is more useful in this case than knowing the brain state – the 'real' pain is a

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brain state. Actually this is smarter than the simple biology, pain is a (brain) signal of actual harm located somewhere in the organism, it is in effect being more 'factual' than a simple biological condition, pain is a symptom of, a condition, a signal of some biological fact elsewhere in the organism, in computing terms it is data – it is a language. The pain is not 'real' in the sense of not being the actual broken limb, it is 'more real' as a conscious sign of the material fact. Subjectivity – consciousness, The Manifest Image is virtual, but that doesn't make it less real or less significant, significance arrives from such virtualities. The Brain creates a 'fiction' of the presence of pain by processing the data into information which then allows the organism to take action. The Mind, the Manifest Image is a higher level implementation. "The manifest image includes practical or moral claims, whereas the scientific image does not."

If the concept was equal to its object then they would be the same, if the process was complete then it would be the same – i.e. no longer a process, if the process was completable then it would be complete. Why it's not is simple- in human terms or in logic – things are bad. Reality has no logical equality- 'real' things are different. We, I, you, are a product of an asymmetrical failure of a state of being. Just to be clear the brain as a computer would fall under the 'Halting Problem' and this, simply put, says we can never know if the software is OK, if it hasn't errors, if it won't do what we expect or want, if it's not BAD. To press the point its being good (if it is) is always hidden from us by this problem – its hiding its goodness is BAD, and it cannot help but do this.

The group, the generic will always be an average. The reality is the badness of individuals who cannot be identified. This seems so unsatisfactory. And of course it is, it, this, is never satisfied. We try to sum things up, sum up others, sum up our selves and relations to the world. Live coherent lives. We judge the successful in these terms, but of course that's wrong. To do anything is to be open to error, only the impossibility of nothing guarantees no errors. The greater the application, project or whatever is, the more likely the errors, great art really represents great struggles and failures. As does science, its theories teeter on the edge of collapse and failure, the greater the theory the greater the failure. This goes for whole disciplines, physics, biology, psychology, philosophy. Strangely Brassier echoing Lyotard sees failure (of life in some future) as a reason for deciding to be dead already and

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embracing nothing. But a definition of 'life' is that it is a state capable of coming to an end – i.e. death. There is a kind of philosophical paradox here of the sort that states death isn't an event in life... which misses the manifest image of ones own death belonging to oneself. A paradox¹¹³ such as saying a length of string cannot have an end because there is either string or no string, the 'no string' not being part of the string. It's a well known paradox, all systems of representation will have them... As Brassier explains the annihilation of life cannot be an empirical fact as it is one which cannot be observed. But then as Meillassoux points out such was the world before life, a universe before life is not observed so too for Brassier must be not empirical. Of course this is silly, Science creates hypotheses which empirical *evidence* supports. We are aware of our death by our thinking and being in the living world, and a logical paradox is of less comfort than an imaginary deity. Evidence in many cases is not the actuality, the Big Bang, quarks or living dinosaurs – but there is evidence of these things. We may find actual life on Mars – evidence of extra-terrestrial life, or fossil remains – evidence of extra-terrestrial life. There is empirical evidence now for the predictions of the future state of the planet and the universe. Evidence which supports various theories one of which is foundational to Brassier's Nihilism.

This ultimate failure is in no way a reason for non activity, or are lesser failures, it's likely that an Einstein would realize that their theory, as good as it is, will probably fail as it, their theory, is like all theories, subject to failure. And smart enough to know that it will be impossible to know ones theory is complete. This thought maybe occurred, but did not deter theorizing. Brassier and Lyotard set up a strawman, that life to some is like mountain climbing and objectives can be achieved which are both universal and absolute, which they then show to be false- that this is all vanity. 'Better a living dog than a dead Lion'. But the philosopher or scientist is more like the potholer who goes deep but never knows if there isn't something even deeper. The greater the project, the greater the risk, and eventual failure, is surprisingly the source of motivation for achievement. The source, or motivation, is discontent, which the empirical evidence shows is ever present. We still see philosophers, Artists, Scientists... people, individuals. The very efforts to identify anything is part of this process of searching for

¹¹³ There is a philosophical trick using such logic, perhaps Brassier like Zeno is not using such tricks, paradoxes, not to state something about living or dying as an empirical reality but to undermine reason itself- *ibid*.

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certainty. Searching for certainty generates uncertainty, and uncertainty generates the desire for certainty.

Heidegger is a notoriously difficult philosopher and I'm neither, however in regard to the individual rather than his hermeneutics – this is where we can take liberties? as a 'model' for how an individual functions subjectively. Alone and *in the world*, and not objectively regarding the world from the philosophical (or scientific) detachment in logic, rhetoric or mathematical terms. Or even in artistic expressive and aesthetic terms. The Artistic Philosophic or Scientific detachment from the world which is obviously an illusion, though useful. But crazy, as it pretends a detachment then asks how can we really know what is actually in the world as if the questioner actually wasn't in the world. This is what Heidegger tells us, theories sit outside of their subject in order to comprehend it, they sit outside the world in which they are formed, which of course is impossible, but the imagination can do this, then it finds a knowledge independent of subjectivity, fine, but then finds this knowledge is seemingly detached from its subject and the things as they actually are in the world. Well yes! It did this deliberately in the first place. Prior to this it was in the world subjectively. It imagined an objectivity – which it did not have – not being God – which was a useful other picture of the world. I'm in the world, I see an apple, and draw the apple, or write about it or think about it, and then ask the crazy question why isn't the drawing, the thought, the text the apple? Why isn't the concept of the apple the same as the apple? The answer is that they are different! And the apple came first. Or my subjective experience of it came first. For me. Now the philosopher asks – but what came before my subjective experience. To do that requires imagination, and of course an object in the imagination isn't real in the same way as the direct experience, it's an image! A very powerful image as it seeks objective truth. And we have seen how it can, but it can never know it to be that absolute objective truth.

Heidegger's reversal of the precedence of thinking and being makes this clear, well he doesn't make it that clear but assuming I'm getting this wrong, what I can get from this is useful to my consideration of subjectivity and the individual. And this is useful to me as it helps me be me in an objective world which ignores me. (The current objective absolute 'world' seems to ignore all 'mes' and creates celebrity.)

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The 'ready-at-hand' and the 'present-at-hand'¹¹⁴. The 'present-at-hand' is a vague way of describing a theory – body of knowledge- reflective conscious thinking, a position where the thinker stands out side the thought's object, which is obviously the model not only for much, but not all, philosophy but all the theoretical sciences. Contrasted is Heidegger's famous hammer which is 'ready-at-hand', it is in its readiness, one of being part of the user, the craftsman-whose awareness of the hammer is pre theoretical, is a specific 'tool' in which it becomes as an organic part of the user in which not knowledge but the sensuality of the hammer is exposed, or revealed in a non theoretical or descriptive way. In 'The Origin of the Work of Art' Heidegger discusses the Van Gogh painting of a peasant's old worn boots. He contrasts the objective factual truth of the boots with their subjective history. This theme is of the 'ready-at-hand' object being a 'truth', similarly it appears in 'The Question Concerning Technology'. The boots tell a specific narrative, they do not picture an object *objectively* as much as reveal a story, a history of a particular individual from the point of experience, of the lonely wet winter fields, the landscape, the being in the world, but here 'the world' is a world of specifics, a low grey sky and winter rain which stings the cheek. Heidegger offers us two 'truths', one of facts, science and technology as machines separate from us ('The Question Concerning Technology'), and another of pre-philosophical, pre-metaphysical being in the world. But even 'being' is insufficient to show the difference. (This maybe accounts for his use of strange terminology) One finds oneself in the world – the world of the ready-at-hand before one can think or philosophize about what this being in the world is. It's not possible to philosophize or think before 'being'. Whatever the outcome of any thinking this makes no difference to the already-being. And this already being is one of contact with the-ready-to-hand. The relationship is one of material, but specifics, with the hammer – a particular hammer on that bench in which the craftsman shares a life, dwells, the worn wooden handle with its marks -the trace or narrative of its life, the hammer's worn handle by the craftsman's hand reveal the years of use, the marks on the hammer witness events, maybe accidents as do the scars on the craftsman's hand, his hand and the handle have worn each other in mutuality, like the worn boots or lines on someone's face worn by the winter's wind and summer's sun. And the relationship with these things is far from academic but a lived existence of the

¹¹⁴ Being and Time. 16:103

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particular. Which here even real names are insufficient to the experience. More the touch, the feel, the smell, the memories. He uses the word 'care' but care for the particular, a particular moment of being such that you seldom find in philosophy or science but in some poetry or novel. Time here is not the one of Special Relativity and confusing time frames, Hawking's brief history or the metaphysics of McTaggart but of the lived individual essence of experience.

"Music!" she signalled. "Music!" But the machine continued: Chuff, chuff, chuff.

"A child new born . . ." she prompted.

"A child new born," Phyllis Jones continued,

*Sprung from the sea
Whose billows blown by mighty storm
Cut off from France and Germany
This isle.*

She glanced back over her shoulder. Chuff, chuff, chuff, the machine buzzed. A long line of villagers in shirts made of sacking began passing in and out in single file behind her between the trees. They were singing, but not a word reached the audience.

England am I, Phyllis Jones continued, facing the audience,

*Now weak and small
A child, as all may see . . .*

Her words peppered the audience as with a shower of hard little stones. Mrs. Manresa in the very centre smiled; but she felt as if her skin cracked when she smiled. There was a vast vacancy between her, the singing villagers and the piping child.

Chuff, chuff, chuff, went the machine like a corn-cutter on a hot day.

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The villagers were singing, but half their words were blown away.

*Cutting the roads . . . up to the hill top . . . we climbed. Down in the valley . .
 . sow, wild boar, hog, rhinoceros, reindeer . . . Dug ourselves in to the hill
 top . . . Ground roots between stones . . . Ground corn . . . till we too . . . lay
 under g—r--o--u--n--d . . .*

The words petered away. Chuff, chuff, chuff, the machine ticked. Then at last the machine ground out a tune!

*Armed against fate
 The valiant Rhoderick
 Armed and valiant
 Bold and blatant
 Firm elatant
 See the warriors--here they come . . .*

This time is individual time, the time of ones life, the irrelevances and worries, childhood memories... lost to others, impossible to identify.

To Absolutes, God, the philosopher or metaphysician we are lost, bad examples. I am wrong. This is wrong, as it's me. Even the spellchecker tells me I'm wrong, even my back which aches. The look of the other at me sees nothing.

And when I speak I'm wrong, of course I'm wrong. So look at the technology not as it is supposed to be used, but as it is to the individual who uses it in company, lost to the group. 'How bad, how impolite... '

So is Art exempt from the criticism of being 'present-at-hand'- it would seem from Heidegger's analysis of the artwork that he claims it is. He also regards poetry as giving us not a 'present-at-hand' truth (academic logical schematic...) but of it having a revealing aspect – *Altethia* 'ready-at-hand'.

"*Altethia*, disclosure thought of as the opening of presence, is not yet truth. Is *aletheia* then less than truth? Or is it more because it first

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grants truth as *adequatio* and *certitudo*, because there can be no presence and presenting outside of the realm of the opening?"

It should be obvious though that such theory is not 'ready-at-hand' – or is even the carefully constructed poem or artwork 'ready-at-hand'... they may **represent** the 'ready-at-hand' but in doing so they distance themselves from the actuality of the given- they **look on the** landscape so fail **to be in it**.

Art works reveal 'truths'- are for Deleuze originators of 'Affects' – or by skill achieve a more universal expression of human emotion, or communication, they can also be academic exercises into the nature of art, objects in their own right... they can be more and perhaps non totalizable representations, abstractions... definitions. Certainly Art exists within a network of sharing. Such an Art is 'identified' – is non individual in that it is in and for a network. These constellations, institutions of Art have been critiqued, however even Anti-Art or Non-Art is now subsumed into Art's networks. So Art removes the individual in identity as a truth, the desire of philosophy and science, an objective truth. The theory is good when it more fully explains and accounts, perfect if it does so for everything. The art is good in its power of expression, the poem, painting or music. Bad Art however is a reverse¹¹⁵ of this, it acknowledges itself as art, or may not, refuses to become a radical critique – typical of modern art – fails to be general, fails to be significant so is 'Bad'. Its incoherence prevents both understanding, representation and judgement, though these can be made it doesn't respond to them and anyway it is considered by 'others' of no consequence, not proper art, not art, poor art or as bad art. Rather than communicate to an audience – of good intent etc. it only serves the 'artist', and in what way, in that it applies only to this individual and it holds a multiplicity of personal moments which fragment definition. It may be a drawing, an object, piece of sound, writing or a thought but in its very non specificity it fails to specify 'Art' – or any other category. Like an individual prior to identification it exists as an individual 'thing' but not a definable 'thing', it is more the extension of the everyday of any individual. Where Heidegger is wrong -perhaps I should say where he is right -is that it's not the Van Gogh painting that is 'ready-at-hand',

¹¹⁵ Not a *reversal* as it does not have to have prior knowledge or experience of 'Art'.

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the painting exists within the complex network of Art, its institutions and theories, its influences and history, the painting like all great Art, Science or Philosophy is 'present-at-hand'. Art is separate from any single particular individual. Individuals are identified with it, Heidegger's text is not 'ready-at-hand' neither is the painting – or was it ever, even when the painting was ignored. It 'represented' from the get go. It was different from the life-world. What was 'ready-at-hand' (sic) were the boots themselves. Their particular history – which to big and proper 'History' was everyday common place and not special **-of no significance** – but to the owner (not any audience) the boots were special with a shared and intimate narrative between the owner and the boots. Shared with the object and the wearer and no one else. One pair of boots being worn by one person within what is 'generally' considered ordinary, which is true, but particular in this ordinariness. From the Big perspective the actual boots are insignificant, from the individual perspective they were crucial to life itself. So the Van Gogh might achieve some common expression, an audience, and this audience and its reception is the criteria at work in 'Good Art', the boots and their wearer are not, will not be considered Art by their wearer or anyone else. They are lost now to 'US' anyway. They are already gone. Their essence was like the rock with the beginnings of tool-use as technology, the intimate relation with an individual. If we want to acknowledge this then I'd argue we do so as a form of art not removed from us but which still exists in the individuation of life, things, events of no importance to any community but only to the participant themselves. This runs counter to art since the Renaissance, an art which began with modern Capitalism. Capital which founded the enlightenment and industrial revolution. The technology of capitalism was the creative force for Art as a significant 'Event'. This 'Significant Event' is that of 'revolution' – industrial – economic – social - whose features are (despite associated names) still found in the work of Deleuze and Badiou¹¹⁶. The events identify history and movements as non individual but of a led mass.

¹¹⁶ Marxism as well as capitalism seeks to identify the individual, and interestingly Marx himself found the non-identification of the individual very worrying – notably his attitude to Stirner. "The Ego and Its Own... sounded the death knell of left Hegelianism... and strikingly written critique of both liberalism and socialism... Karl Marx was only one of many contemporaries provoked into a lengthy rebuttal of Stirner's argument."

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They are classifications. Definitions. Badiou's use of mathematics is a use of a universalism.

"Art cannot merely be the expression of a particularity.... it abstracts itself from all particularity.... art is related to a kind of aristocratic-proletarian ethic ... art must be as rigorous as a mathematical demonstration, as surprising as an ambush in the night, and as elevated as a star... All art, and all thought, is ruined when we accept this permission to consume, to communicate and to enjoy. We should become the pitiless censors of ourselves¹¹⁷."

Well Alain – no! - so we as individuals should not enjoy the world- but critique any use of the things in the world? No - the common place of life in actuality – is actuality prior to philosophy - outside of all philosophy – even a philosophy which treats us and everything else at its foundation as a mathematical set which orders the world – the 'actual' is the particularity of the engagement between discrete objects and not 'the many treated as one'¹¹⁸. Now the new technology is individual. Pace 'High Art' individuals now as art personae, art objects¹¹⁹ can enjoy the rapture and sensuality of their own lives in their intimate relations with others, a pet dog, candy bar, lover, pair of new shoes, or iPhone, just as these objects do with each other. Their beauty like all individual emotions cannot be shared or properly communicated but nevertheless exists, and in most cases are the real 'Reality'. We can no more share in this, in understanding, knowledge or feeling than share the grief of actual mourning, the particular instantiation, an unknown snowflake colliding with an unseen rock. And these particular instances are the basis for everything else. We have direct access to the real all the time, the difficulty only arises when we seek to generalize this into some

¹¹⁷ Alain Badiou - Fifteen Theses on Contemporary Art.

¹¹⁸ 'the many treated as one' – A mathematical set.

¹¹⁹ In a kind of reversal of Richard Hamilton's statement about Pop Art the current technology individualizes the mass markets – the craftsman's 'ready-at-hand' becomes the individuals access to making their own (lives) art - "Pop Art," he wrote, "is Popular (designed for a mass audience), Transient (short-term solution), Expendable (easily forgotten), Low Cost, Mass Produced, Young (aimed at youth), Wicked, Sexy, Gimmicky, Glamorous, Big Business."

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universal truth. The truth of the snowflake and the rock is a different truth from my experience of a mirage on a hot summer's road. Any universal truth means stepping outside these encounters to generalize them- which is obviously useful but actually impossible. In terms of any philosophical or physical / mathematical description of an event like these, obviously I get it wrong, but also the snowflake and the rock get it wrong philosophically. Why, because they are not mathematics- they cannot be generalized for if they were they would lose their individuality and become part of a schema. In Harman's terms they would merge with everything¹²⁰. Or do they in themselves represent a schema. As mathematics they are hopeless, as a schematizing event they fail, they are bad at both. As is my experience of a mirage on a hot summer's road.

"Actual works of art are little more than historical curiosities. As far as art is concerned Van Gogh's paintings aren't worth any more than his palette is."


Strange how I now find this to be not true of Art but true of Bad Art – 'little more than...' but to Van Gogh his palette was much more than a historical curiosity.. it was 'ready-at-hand'.

'Subjective Realism' provides a framework for the Humanities which is not dependent on Science- 'Scientism' or Mathematics, and defers this now not to novelty, 'the truth', shock or any other modernist trope. In the use of new technology the subject avoids pure relativism. It acknowledges the Ready-at-hand as the technology with which the subject has an individual relationship of 'use'. And this use is not formal-rational or logical which includes dialectical materialism – (dialectics of logic – materialism of matter - the product of the steam engine..) but of 'feeling' and intimacy, desire... insatiability.... technofetishism. The key term here is '*insatiable* desire', which frees the individual from any definition -defining – final identification. The ready-at-hand is never taken for granted but sensuously enjoyed. The

¹²⁰ This merging is only the 'logical' merging once objects are fully identified. But a full identity would mean the concept was identical to the object. Harman says this is impossible because the object is infinite, I say its impossible because the concept pretends absoluteness and the object is finite. The concept is the sign, the object the signified. Signs can be equal A=A, objects can not. There is always difference -in reality – in the world – in any repetition.

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individual enjoys the sensuous dominance of the technology which began with the rock's presentation as tool-being to humans or the fire which created human intelligence in the first place. Music has more than other art forms always had associated technologies with which the musician was sensuously engaged, using the mouth or the hands and Personae who demonstrated this - Liszt and Hendrix... et al, only now with post-modern technology is such a jouissance available for all. Within Post-modern consumerism more than ever the subject can engage with these technologies. It is they, the gear, which provides the framework for the subject to become **Personae**. A term which derives from an actors mask - but also a way of being some**one** to (and not for) others in the world.. the usefulness of a manifest image which both hides the vulnerable anima and projects an id - "To overturn the theater of representation into the order of desiring-production."¹²¹ It is they, which are democratic technologies, which remove the old Capitalist Elitism and values in acts of creativity, which marks the end of Capitalism (and thought) in the insatiable lust for technology. Through the use of machines not just for "the misguided enthusiasm of impressionable graduate students" or the "individual full of ill will who does not manage to think, either naturally or conceptually"... but "affordable for everyone and compatible with all other music gear."¹²²



¹²¹ Deleuze and Guattari Anti-Oedipus p. 311.

¹²² Teenage Engineering Cheap Monday Pocket Operators.

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“There is no abstract machine, or machines, in the sense of a Platonic Idea, transcendent, universal, eternal. Abstract machines operate with concrete assemblages... they constitute becomings... on a technological “plane” ...”¹²³

Is the above statement 'provisional', contingent and now no longer the case, in which case there IS a transcendent.... etc.. and if it is still the case and ever will be there IS a transcendent.... etc.

¹²³ Deleuze and Guattari a thousand plateaus p. 510

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The Divinity of Insatiable Desire.

"The most sophisticated inventions are boring if they do not lead to an exacerbation of the mystery concealed by what we discover, what is revealed to us."

"God is the name of the possibility I have of keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior. ... a witness that others cannot see, and who is therefore at the same time other than me and more intimate with me than myself, as soon as I have a secret relationship with myself ... as soon as there is secrecy and secret witnessing within me, and for me there is what I call God... when there appears the desire and power to render absolutely"¹²⁴

The concepts such as 'the absolute' or infinity are strange. We never experience these so their technological origin is difficult to realise. We might consider Harman's ideas (and others in OOO) here regarding the impossibility of knowing - "the secret essence", however this doesn't present us with any absolute, or any infinity, neither does Meillassoux as his absolute is 'contingent' i.e. likely to change. which in more simple terms is the idea of 'certain uncertainty' - a contradiction or paradox. My answer here is that though thinking is a technology its very exhaustibility hints at the illusion of the inexhaustible. The impossibility of technologies, a perfect car, perfect computer. We have seen this is not a question with a definite answer, of impossibility but one of uncertainty, 'The Halting Problem'. The (technological) idea of the Absolute presents us with a fiction which is possible but always indefinite.

The infinite, the absolute will always escape finite thought¹²⁵, which is obvious – absolute infinities are not finite. They must be non finite. The demand for their finite reality is madness, yet we can think about them. We only ever experience immanent finitude but the transcendent is

¹²⁴ The Gift of Death – J Derrida p.108

¹²⁵ I'm aware that much work has been undertaken on the nature of mathematical infinities – see notes above. Even so "we know that the class V of all sets is not a set. V is not the form of a possible thought. This means that whenever a person believes himself to be thinking of the true V, he is deluded." Rudy Rucker *Infinity and the Mind*. p.202

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imaginable. The transcendent which is not immanent so cannot be 'realised' seems empty of physical stuff. Can we do stuff with this emptiness without any 'mysticism'. Well yes, we can build mathematics. This is a reversal of Badiou's idea of set theory being ontology and building us, being the being of this immanence of the here and now past and future. These sets are infinite and cannot account for finitude¹²⁶ ... they are transcendent and not imminently present. We may 'imagine' these, but are they just 'imaginary' objects? Are such 'things' as prime numbers imaginary things which only came into existence once thought? It seems strange to think such things did not exist before cognition as they appear to have an independence of thought, in that we can think correctly or not about such things, discover new things about them. We can and do know transcendent objects, numbers and universals. The idea that a symbol can represent things makes a symbol a transcendent object as it always represents without changing. Every physical mark is unique – every single conceptual mark is identical. The written A is never $A=A$ but the transcendent A is $A=A=A...$ infinitely. Language like logic and mathematics presents its objects as identities which is how they are useful. Thinking has developed abstractions, or located the idea of abstractions with which to think.

Obviously the transcendent is an idea, but could it be made real as a 'thing'. No, because it is transcendent. If we treat it as a real thing we get problems. Which means not that it doesn't exist, it does, but its existence is different. Hegel in 'The Phenomenology of Spirit' goes to great (incomprehensible) lengths to produce pure thought, which is empty. With this he can construct a transcendental account of 'Being' in 'The Science of Logic'. I'll try another route. Though I'm not so good at maths... Obviously Zero is real, but also obviously it's not a thing. If you think it's not real then you can't have no money, or no car or no ocean going yacht, you can't score zero in a test... I'm doing this remember to show that you can have transcendent things but they are not like real finite stuff.

So lets treat zero like any other thing, it's a finite number.

¹²⁶ Any fraction of an infinity is tricky. Though you can think of the finite numbers 2,6,8,11 as being a finite part of an infinity of whole numbers, what sort of fraction, can they be a fraction? Half of infinity is infinity as is 1000^{th} and is a $1/\text{googolplex}...$

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Divide 5 by 5

The answer is 1. Divide any number by itself and the answer will be 1.
(try it) – use a calculator if you like.

Now do this with zero- $0/0 = 1$

If you used a calculator you would not get that result. So zero is not ontologically the same as any other whole number it seems...

Here is why...

An example..

$$12 / 3 = 4$$

we can reverse this process by using multiplication -

$$4 \times 3 = 12 \quad \text{so}$$

$$12 / 0 = 0 \quad \text{so}$$

$$0 \times 0 = 12 ?$$

OK maybe not? Because not only $0 \times 0 = 12$ but $0 \times 0 =$ other numbers!
Any other zero division results in the same, which is obviously very strange.

If $6 / 0 = 0$ then

$$0 \times 0 = 6$$

If $2 / 0 = 0$ then

$$0 \times 0 = 2$$

and so on... which means that

$$0 \times 0 = \text{'any number and all numbers at once'!}$$

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So saying dividing any number by zero gives zero seems wrong – or not sensible!

$12 / 0 = 12$ might seem more reasonable.... at least an alternative...
and so $12 \times 0 = 12$

but

$$12 / 1 = 12$$

$$12 \times 1 = 12 \quad \text{OK?}$$

but

$$12 \times 1 = 12 \text{ and}$$

$$12 \times 0 = 12$$

so

$$12/1 = 12/0$$

$$0 = 1 ? \quad \text{..... obviously not!}$$

Zero is a 'peculiar' 'thing'.... it's not just different as a mark, just as 6 is different to 8, it 'behaves' differently in division to other numbers- other numbers which behave the same, whose 'being' is the same. In short you can divide numbers by other numbers but not by zero. Or you can but the result is 'undefined'. Which is odd for us non mathematicians. I must add in mathematics zero isn't a 'transcendental' number though these do exist. However we might be allowed to think of it as a transcendent thing – the mathematician Bhaskara considered any number divided by zero gave infinity¹²⁷, as when we divide numbers by ever smaller

¹²⁷ And I think infinities are transcendent.

“adjective

1. going beyond ordinary limits; surpassing; exceeding.
2. superior or supreme.
3. Theology. (of the Deity) transcending the universe, time, etc.
4. Philosophy. a. Scholasticism. above all possible modes of the infinite.
b. Kantianism. transcending experience; not realizable in human experience.”

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numbers the result gets larger so the smallest number, 0 gives the largest result possible, infinity.

$$8 / 2 = 4$$

$$8 / 0.5 = 16$$

$$8 / 0.00007 = 114285.7142857143$$

$$8 / 0 = \text{infinity}.. \quad \infty$$

I need to explain that there is a difference between 'transcendent' and transcendental. Simply, my use of 'Transcendent' is to describe things which are beyond any immanent experience. 'Transcendental' are things which we immanently experience which 'point to' transcendent ideas or behave like them. This is roughly how Kant saw these terms. He thought Transcendent things belonged to old dogmatic metaphysics of the scholastic philosophers and Greek thought, a good example being Plato's 'Forms'¹²⁸.

Compare transcendental.

¹²⁸ If we get more technical some definitions show this difference- for Transcendent.

'(Of God) existing apart from and not subject to the limitations of the material universe. Often contrasted with immanent. In scholastic philosophy higher than or not included in any of Aristotle's ten categories. In Kantian philosophy not realizable in experience.'

Kant rejected the scholastic 'Transcendent' as he saw it open to sceptical criticism (from Hume et al) and so used similar categories to Aristotle (see above) and made these A priori necessary for experience, so whilst they are not Transcendent to experience they limit experience and are necessary for it, so he used the term 'Transcendental'. If you like they limit our knowledge to experience and these concepts for dealing with experience. These he saw as necessary and so foundational to knowledge. They use reason and are 'pure'. Pure as in TRUE - A priori necessary. He saw that without their truth we could know nothing and experience nothing. Of course we do experience things. Only he would say we only experience them via his categories and never the things in themselves.

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It might be convenient to say there are no transcendent things, but in simple computing the circuits will not allow you to divide by zero, not because zero isn't real, not because 0 doesn't exist, it does, but that it is 'different'¹²⁹. You can do similar things with infinite sets, which is where Badiou locates 'Being'. But more importantly you should now see such a transcendent 'Being' is not like finite being. We can and do employ transcendent things in the finite and immanent world as they are useful. They do not change, the finite world does. Mathematicians have played in transcendent worlds for ages and still do, oddly philosophers have given up on this transcendent world, as have surprisingly many theologians. I suppose the reason for this abandonment is these worlds are not 'real' like the immanent world and seem oddly 'old-fashioned' and linked to conservative non-materialist religions.. Odd then that much of our understanding of the real and immanent world is based on mathematical expressions. That the properties of prime numbers are the same for us as they are for computers, and useful in encrypting our passwords when shopping online. Computers as of yet do not 'pretend' and make up stuff like primes or Popeye...

Finite thought can think the infinite. This infinite is real in a strange way such that though it exists it doesn't do so in the same way as that tree in the garden, or my brain or this Biro. And this 'strangeness' is no more mysterious than typing in 0 / 0 into your pocket calculator. We now have two different types of 'Being', the Transcendent and the Immanent. Problems do arise when we then apply the same methods and thoughts across these two types of being and expect the same results. In the past in philosophy this problem was solved by saying either one of these types of being was not real, and trying to get rid of it. Recent philosophy obviously tried to rid us of the transcendent. It probably did this because early (Greek and medieval) philosophy if not wanting to get rid of the immanent saw it as inferior to the transcendent. At its extreme certain religions see this immanent world as 'fallen' or even not actually 'real' but an illusion – Maya. And this was the cause of many difficulties. Language as well as mathematics seems transcendent, yet is applied

¹²⁹ Actually I'm saying ALL numbers are transcendent as well as other objects. We never come across a prime walking down the street- it's non material. Kant seemed to reject Transcendent objects as he couldn't prove them for certain to be real. I suspect Harman and OOO would accept them as real as I do, (he is OK about the reality of Popeye et al..) however I think they are ontologically different to Immanent Objects.

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immanently. It is not that one or the other is wrong- (IMO?), it's just that they are fundamentally different. Rules in the Transcendent world might be absolute, but when used in the immanent world (this finite world) are only convenient and provisional. Which is why you can't eat the word 'Apple', and why all real apples are never the same. So though obviously transcendent things don't exist 'here', this doesn't mean they do not exist. They do – we use them here in this real world, as well as in the past in metaphysics and still do now in mathematics¹³⁰. We can speculate about their natures in their transcendent world though few philosophers do these days. But transcendent objects' natures of existence might be interesting, just in our imaginations or elsewhere. Or nowhere? Like zero. From our finite and immanent reality we can think of the Transcendent, The perfect, The Absolute. These are two very different worlds, being in the immanent world is finite and temporal, being in the transcendent world would be infinite and atemporal. We can think a lot about the transcendent world. Does it exist just as thought, well maybe, maybe not. Could we have immanent experience of it, no. Can we do stuff with it – yes. Thinking is transcendental... Because thinking seems useful and good maybe that is why it seems 'above'-transcendent from the immanent world of stuff. Which maybe is why it was thought such transcendent 'worlds' – AKA Heaven were above us in the sky and was a 'better' place. With materialism and science this other world fell out of favour, was considered just childish fantasy. It failed to offer the 'goods' of materialism and capitalism which promised 'heaven on earth'. A problem was however that from the Transcendent world we got mathematics and universals, languages, rules...laws... scientific explanations...

Pace Derrida - "We should stop thinking about God as someone over there, way up there... [a] satellite orbiting in space..." but as a Transcendent in our thinking.

We can now see that transcendent metaphysical thinking is possible. Moreover that the common place and general questions 'ordinary people' (non philosophers) ask are valid but need careful metaphysical transcendental consideration. For instance the question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' We can now do some speculative

¹³⁰ Mathematics can be 'pure' or 'applied'. Can be done in its Platonic Transcendent world, and also applied in this Immanent world.

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metaphysics and see that absolute nothing can't be immanent. We can't say nothing 'is' or if we do we follow the same reasoning as treating 0 as a finite number which then makes $0 = 1$ which it obviously is not. The 'existence' of nothing is a transcendent phenomena. We can think it and use it, but cannot realise it in the immanent finite world. There are many transcendent things that we can't materialize. Or questions like 'what does all this (immanent finite world) mean'. The immanent being of the finite world is not piece of language which signifies another thing. The word 'apple' has a meaning in its identifying fruit, a real apple does not. So this world is not meaningless or meaningful as it's not a sign. As we saw above with 'The Image of Thought' in D&R, 'identification' when applied to 'things', immanent beings, removes their individuality, and makes them no longer things, no longer individuals – which they are, but treats them as universal signifiers which they are not. For sure if a concept could equal its object the object would cease to be an individual. There is no problem for real physical 'objects' merging with everything as they are different, the concept / sign 'apple' or sign-object is identical with all other apple-object signs, this is not a problem but a feature of signification. In the immanent world we can have 'similarities' but never identities, identicals. In the metaphysical transcendent world we can have identicals which co-exist, e.g. $2 + 2 = 4$. It's generally accepted that mathematics takes place in a transcendent 'world' similar to Plato's 'Forms', and $2 + 2 = 4$ might seem a banal example but more exotic 'things' like infinities, absolutes and God(s) also occur in the Transcendent world.. The nature of these 'things' 'existence' is interesting, whilst some may regard these as all products of the imagination, with mathematics, at least, there is a feeling that mathematical objects exist independently of minds.

Hopefully we can now see the mistake in confusing the immanent with the transcendent or in wanting to make either the other or either like the other or superior or inferior to the other. The hammer that is ready-at-hand is not the same as the concept 'hammer' which is present-at-hand. Though each has a use and the present-at-hand has a meaning.

'Good' Music, good Art would be that which is present-at-hand yet doesn't signify a ready-at-hand by which confusion might occur. Which is what Badiou stated above, however that kind of Abstract Art would be metaphysical and transcendent and as such it would have no materiality, which was the telos of modernity. A telos which ended in

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Silence and The Empty Gallery, so though Badiou was in a way right regarding the form of High Art or Good Art, what he asked for was the immanence of the transcendent, which is not possible. This disappearance of high art might seem now unfortunate for us post-moderns, however it needn't be. Though a material transcendent is not possible, a material 'thing' which points to a transcendent, a transcendental object is possible. There are many forms this might take some of which are obvious from history, religious images and architecture for instance. In Art – High Art – one method would be a simple re-presentation of the modernist Art Object prior to its disappearance, a re-presentation as an original repetition. In other words Art's subject would be Art. Likewise a philosophy, a metaphysics or a religion would have as its subject itself. To ask what would be the point of this, to see it as idle speculation would miss the point which is that it is what it is.

"it is meaningless to ask why and for what purpose we philosophize. For philosophy is grounded only in terms of itself – or else not at all, just as art reveals its truth only through itself."¹³¹

The pragmatic 'usefulness' is nothing to do with its reality though pragmatic 'effects' might be associated with such activities. Much art, such as religious art or 'experimental' art, was made not in order to express personal feelings or transmit these to others, entertain or to give pleasure but now for many it does just this. Metaphysics and Religion are not pragmatic activities like fishing but may also give pleasure or other immanent experiences to their audiences.

One can have knowledge of God – a Transcendent 'Being', to then ask of it to be an immanent reality in order to qualify its acceptance as existent is just stupid. Which BTW accounts for the problem of evil, Evil is an immanent reality, and God is a transcendent reality. The two can not co-exist other than in different realities. Rather than argue that because there is no immanent God (to prevent evil) therefore there is no God the problem (of Evil) is wanting the transcendent to be immanent and sees this impossibility of the immanence of a transcendent as proof of non-existence. The label of 'The Divine' being mere fiction as it lacks

¹³¹ Heidegger – Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Freedom. p.10

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immanence does not follow. A transcendent God also avoids the problems of 'space' in the realization of an Absolute God in this immanent world, there would be no room for 'us' unless we became part of God, a pantheism, but I'm not in anyway an 'absolute', or can you have a part of an absolute which isn't absolute. 1/100000 of infinity is infinity.

The whole of thinking itself relies on the idea of the transcendent reality of signs. What guarantees the immanent working of these signs is not contingency but a transcendent reality. And this is not that complicated, games like tennis and football exist immanently, yet rely on transcendent 'rules'. And obviously whilst transcendent rules can mutually exist in an abstract world¹³² without contradiction immanent games cannot. One cannot play tennis and football simultaneously. Or is a realisation of the rules the absolute game. We can break the rules in immanent existence, in an actual game, but this does not prove the rules do not exist. One cannot help see the analogy or reality with Quantum Physics, the mutual rules or possible states collapsing into a definite state when observed in the immanent world. A universal (existing in the transcendent world) collapses into an individual when it becomes manifest in the immanent world. Horse(ness)¹³³ becomes a horse in its immanent manifestation. The Image of Thought in WiP, despite Deleuze, is the Transcendent Plane, is not the context, not the Immanent Plane. And the immanent realisation is never the transcendent which is timeless and space-less. Here we can appreciate the difference is not one of any hierarchy or origin. Or should either be a reflection of the other, but metaphorical connections can and do usefully occur. We can never see pure 'horseness' but horseness is useful, though remember if it is useful to recognition then this is dogma. Ordinary living in its practicalities of the taken for granted is dogmatic, and is not essentially a creative process. (From D&R above)


A criticism often made is that Religion is the projection of an immanence, this is as wrong as the supposition that immanence is a

¹³² Such an 'Abstract World' is timeless, all the rules are immediately present, and not dependent on any material essence.

¹³³ Horseness from our immanent perspective seems vague and not a 'thing' but a possibility of many things. When we see a horse this vagueness 'collapses' into the specific horse here and now.

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mathematical event or demiurge of a transcendent. The two 'spaces' are different. Physics is not Metaphysics and Metaphysics is not Physics. The senses deliver the immanent world to us, thinking delivers the transcendent.



ⁱ Connections is a 10-episode documentary television series and 1978 book (Connections, based on the series) created, written, and presented by science historian James Burke. The series was produced and directed by Mick Jackson of the BBC Science and Features Department and first aired in 1978 (UK) and 1979 (USA). It took an interdisciplinary approach to the history of science and invention, and demonstrated how various discoveries, scientific achievements, and historical world events were built from one another successively in an interconnected way to bring about particular aspects of modern technology. The series was noted for Burke's crisp and enthusiastic presentation (and dry humour), historical re-enactments, and intricate working models.

1. "The Trigger Effect" details the world's present dependence on complex technological networks through a detailed narrative of New York City and the power blackout of 1965. Agricultural technology is traced to its origins in ancient Egypt and the invention of the plough. The segment ends in Kuwait where, because of oil, society leapt from traditional patterns to advanced technology in a period of only about 30 years.

2. "Death in the Morning" examines the standardisation of precious metal with the touchstone in the ancient world. This innovation stimulated trade from Greece to Persia, ultimately causing the construction of a huge commercial center and library at Alexandria which included Ptolemy's star tables. This wealth of astronomical knowledge aided navigators during the age of discovery 14 centuries later following the introduction of lateen sails and sternpost rudders. Mariners discovered that the compass's magnetised needle did not actually point directly north. Investigations into the nature of magnetism by Gilbert led to the discovery of electricity by way of the sulphur ball of von Guericke. Further interest in atmospheric electricity at the Ben Nevis weather station led to Wilson's cloud chamber which in turn allowed development of both Watson-Watt's radar and (by way of Rutherford's insights) nuclear weaponry.

3. "Distant Voices" suggests that telecommunications exist because Normans had stirrups for horse riding which in turn led them to further advancements in warfare. Deep mine shafts flooded and scientists in search of a solution examined vacuums, air pressure, and other natural phenomena.

4. "Faith in Numbers" examines the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance from the perspective of how commercialism, climate change, and the Black Death influenced cultural development. He examines the impact of Cistercian waterpower on the Industrial Revolution, derived from Roman watermill technology such as that of the Barbegal aqueduct and mill. Also covered are the Gutenberg printing press, the Jacquard loom, and the Hollerith punch card tabulator that led to modern computer programming.

5. "The Wheel of Fortune" traces astrological knowledge in ancient Greek manuscripts from Baghdad's founder, Caliph Al-Mansur, via the Muslim monastery/medical school at Gundeshapur, to the medieval Church's need for alarm clocks (the water horologium and the verge and foliot clock). The clock mainspring gave way to the pendulum clock, but the latter could not be used by mariners, thus the need for precision machining by way of Huntsman's improved steel (1797) and Maudslay's use (1800) of Ramsden's idea of using a screw to better measure (which he took from the turner's trade). This process made a better mainspring and was also used by the Royal Navy to make better blocks. Le Blanc mentioned this same basic idea to Thomas Jefferson, who transmitted this

"American system of manufactures" – precision machine-tooling of musket parts for interchangeability – to New Englanders Eli Whitney, John Hall, and Simeon North. The American efficiency expert Frank Gilbreth and his psychologist wife later improved the whole new system of the modern production line.

6. "Thunder in the Skies" implicates the Little Ice Age (circa 1250–1300 AD) in the invention of the chimney, as well as knitting, buttons, wainscoting, wall tapestries, wall plastering, glass windows (Hardwick Hall [1597] has "more glass than wall"), and the practice of privacy for sleeping and sex. The genealogy of the steam engine is then examined: Thomas Newcomen's engine for pumping water out of mines (1712); Abraham Darby's cheap iron from coke, James Watt's addition of a second condensing cylinder (for cooling) to the engine (1763); John Wilkinson's improving of cannon boring (for the French military) and cylinder making (for Watt; 1773–75). Wilkinson's brother-in-law, Joseph Priestley, investigated gases, leading Alessandro Volta to invent "bad air" (marsh gas) detectors and ignitors. Meanwhile, Edwin Drake discovered oil (in Pennsylvania), allowing Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach (in Bad Cannstatt) to replace town gas with gasoline as fuel for auto engines (1883). They also invented (in 1892) the carburetor (inspired by the medical atomizers, which also developed from Priestley's work) and a new ignition system inspired by Volta's "bad air" detection spark gun. Finally, piano-maker Wilhelm Kress unsuccessfully attempted (1901) to fly the first seaplane on an Austrian lake using the new gasoline engine.

7. "The Long Chain" traces the invention of the fluyt freighter in Holland in the 16th century. Voyages were insured by Edward Lloyd (Lloyd's of London) if the ships' hulls were covered in pitch and tar (which came from the colonies until the American War of Independence in 1776). In Culross, Scotland, Archibald Cochrane (9th Earl of Dundonald) tried to distill coal vapour to get coal tar for ships' hulls, which led to the discovery of ammonia. The search for artificial quinine to treat malaria led to the development of artificial dyes, which Germany used to produce fertilizers to grow wheat and led to the advancement of chemistry which in turn led to DuPont's discovery of polymers such as nylon.

8. "Eat, Drink and Be Merry..." begins with plastic, the plastic credit card, and the concept of credit, then leaps back to the time of the dukes of Burgundy, the first state to use credit. The dukes used credit for many luxuries, and to buy more armour for a stronger army. The Swiss opposed the army of Burgundy and invented a new military formation (with soldiers using pikes) called the pike square. The pike square, along with events following the French Revolution, set in motion the growth in the size of armies and in the use of ill-trained peasant soldiers. Feeding these large armies became a problem for Napoleon, which caused the innovation of bottled food. The bottled food was first put in champagne bottles then in tin cans. Canned food was used for armies and for navies. In one of the bottles, the canned food went bad, and people blamed the spoiled food on "bad air", also known as swamp air. Investigations around "bad air" and malaria led to the innovation of air conditioning and refrigeration. In 1892, Sir James Dewar invented a container that could keep liquids hot or cold (the thermos) which led three men – Tsiolkovsky, Robert Goddard, and Hermann Oberth – to construct a large thermal flask for either liquid hydrogen and oxygen or for solid fuel combustion for use in rocket propulsion, applying the thermal flask principle to keep rocket fuel cold and successfully using it for the V-2 rocket and the Saturn V rocket that put man on the moon.

9. "Countdown" connects the invention of the movie projector to improvements in castle fortifications caused by the invention and use of the cannon. The use of the cannon caused changes in castle fortifications to eliminate a blind spot where cannon fire could not reach. This improvement in castle defence caused innovation in offensive cannon fire, which eventually required maps. Thus, a need arose to view and map locations (like a mountain top) from a long distance, which led to the invention of limelight light source, and later the incandescent light. Burke turns to the next ingredient for a movie projector, film. Film is made with celluloid (made with guncotton) which was first invented as a substitute for ivory in billiard balls. Next was the invention of the zoopraxiscope which was first used for a bet to see if a horse's hooves all left the ground at any point while galloping. The zoopraxiscope used frame-by-frame pictures and holes on the side to allow the machine to pull the film forward. Communication signals for railways using Morse's telegraph led to Edison discovering how to speak into a microphone creating bumps on a disc that could be played back—the record player. This final ingredient gave movies sound. In summary, Burke connects the invention of the movie projector to four major innovations in history: the incandescent light, the discovery of celluloid, the projector that uses frame-by-frame pictures on celluloid, and finally, recorded sound.

10. "Yesterday, Tomorrow and You" recaps the theme that change causes more change. Burke ties together the modern inventions in which previous episodes had culminated: telecommunications, the computer, the jet engine, plastics, rockets, television, the production line, and the atomic bomb. All of these inventions come together in the B-52 nuclear bomber. Start with the plow, you get irrigation, pottery, craftsmen, civilisation and writing, mathematics, a calendar to predict floods, empires, and a modern world where change happens so rapidly you cannot keep up. What do you do? Stop the change? Throw away all technology and live like cavemen? Decide what change will be allowed by law? Or just accept that the world is changing faster than we can keep up with?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connections_%28TV_series%29#Connections_.281978.29